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??????? ???? ????? ???????? ???????? ????????? ???????????? ????????? ???? ??????
controversial,1 his Fourth Amendment jurisprudence proved something of an exception?
many tributes after his passing ????????????????????????????????????????????????2 In a 
line of cases from 1991 to 2013, Scalia reestablished the premise that the Fourth 
Amendment should be interpreted through the lens of the Founding era,3 critiqued the 
????????????? ??????????? ?????????? expectation of privacy standard created in Katz v. 
United States,4 ??????????????????????????????????????????????-??????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
been tied to property rights, including most notably the common law of trespass.5
???? ??????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ???? ???????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-in-practice 
????????????????????????????????l treatment of the Fourth Amendment and finds that?far 
from a revolution in legal affairs?his property-plus synthesis was largely consistent with 
?????????????????????????????????????h and early twentieth centuries and even holds some 
commonalities with th??? ??? ??????????????????????? ?????????? ????? ????????? ???????????
return to the primacy of property rights and the common law of trespass was his successful 
effort to use the property line as a bulwark against erosion of the privacy right embedded 
in the Fourth Amendment. That is, Scalia returned to property law to expand privacy 
protections, not constrict them. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
while the second considers whether the origins of the Fourth Amendment are sufficiently 
knowable to allow for a strictly originalist mode of analysis. Specifically, Part II reviews 
the extensive work of legal historians on the original intent and meaning of the Fourth 
                                                          
 1.  Cass R. Sunstein, In Memoriam: Justice Antonin Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (2016); Jamal Greene, 
Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL. REV. 325, 326 (2009) (arguing that Heller 
was a departure from Scalia?s usual approach that may prove to be the doctrine?s high-water mark). 
2. See, e.g., Justice Sonia Sotomayor, A Tribute to Justice Scalia, 126 YALE L.J. 1609, 1610?11 (2017); 
Connor Winn, Justice Scalia: Defender of the Fourth Amendment, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. AMICUS BLOG (Apr. 
11, 2016), http://harvardcrcl.org/justice-scalia-defender-of-the-fourth-amendment/; Jonathan Blanks, Justice 
Scalia: Underappreciated Fourth Amendment Defender, CATO INSTITUTE (Feb. 15, 2016, 10:24 AM), 
http://www.cato.org/blog/justice-scalia-underappreciated-fourth-amendment-defender.
3. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624?25 
(1991). 
 4. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97?98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
5. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012); Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33?34 (2001). 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the focus of 
this Article.6 This provides the foundation necessary to analyze how the Court relied on 
history over time, discussing the pre-Revolutionary era common law origins of the Fourth 
Amendment on both sides of the Atlantic, in Revolutionary state constitutions, and in 
debates over the new Constitution and the drafting of the Fourth Amendment, with an 
original focus on the contributions of moderate Antifederalists whose ultimate cooperation 
was essential to ratification. 
The ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Fourth Amendment decisions from the seminal Boyd v. United States7 in 1886 through 
??????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????????? ??????? ???? ??????????????? ????? ????? ????
Founding through the early twentieth century. Typified by Boyd, the Court examined 
Founding-era documents and common law antecedents to discern the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment?considering property rights, but keeping focus on broader principles. 
Part I?? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????? era, during the early-to-mid twentieth century. 
Typified by Olmstead v. United States,8 ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
on property, but relied more on analogy to precedent than on historical work. Part V 
examines the legal realist approach of the Warren Court. Best known for Katz v. United 
States9 but more typified by two lesser-known predecessors, the Court relied on 
consequentialism based in Founding-era principles. And Part VI looks at the ascendancy 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
Taken together, this survey demonstrates conclusively that the Court has been fairly 
consistent in applying quasioriginalist techniques, incorporating historical analysis to 
discern something like original meaning or original intent. 
Finally, Part VII analyzes the three key Fourth Amen?????? ????????? ????????????
2017?2018 term and offers cautious predictions about how it is likely to proceed. Most 
notably, the five opinions in Carpenter v. United States10 represent three distinct 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to Katz and the common law; Justices Thomas and Alito take a stridently originalist 
approach; and Justice Gorsuch?like Scalia before him?offers a careful mixture of the 
two. ???? ?????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
two cases,11 is in keeping with the traditional approach to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence?and projects that this paradigm is likely to once again become the 
dominant one in the years to come. 
I. ORIGINALISM AND ITS CRITIQUES
The theory of originalism arose in reaction to the perceived excesses of the Warren 
Court.12 Justice Scalia colorfully lampooned th???????????????????????????????????-law 
                                                          
 6. Scalia?s other Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is also well-known, but this Article focuses on the 
enumerated places clause because of its centrality to the property-plus synthesis. 
 7. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 8. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 10. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 11. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018); Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018). 
12. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1089 (2015) 
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??????????????????????????????? in government that has developed in recent centuries, called 
???????????13 And he insisted that his preferred method of interpretation, originalism, 
??????? ?? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ?????????? ?????? its difficulties and uncertainties 
negligible compared to a philosophy that allows the Constitution to change.14 But for that 
to be true, it must not only be the case that common-?????????????????????????????????? ????
also be possible for or?????????? ??? ????? ??? ???????? ???????? ?? ?????? ???????? ????? ??????
decades of arguments as to the latter point, while Subpart B examines more recent critiques 
??? ???? ????????? ???????? ??????????????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ????? ???? ?????????? ???? ???
synthesized into an approach that could be called incremental originalism, a descriptive 
term for how the Supreme Court?including Scalia?generally used history in its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.15
A. Proponents: Eliding History’s Limits
The oft-cited origin of originalism is a 1971 law review article by Robert Bork that 
?????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Supreme Court is legitimate.16 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the Constitution will change, often quite dramatically, as the personnel of the Supreme 
?????? ?????????17 Extending rather dramatically the argument of Herbert Wechsler,18
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
derived, defin?????????????????19 ?????????????????????which principles was limited, but 
??? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ????? ????? ??????? ???????? ??? ????????? ??????? ????? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
actually t???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????20 The former became known as original intent.21 This 
nascent precept soon appeared in the judiciary, though again more as critique than 
                                                          
(connecting originalism to the Warren Court?s desegregation decisions and describing it as, ?in part, an 
expression of, and a response to, anxieties that were widely felt during the Nixon era and that had cultural and 
political roots, no less than legal ones?). 
 13. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 7, 9 (1997). 
14. Id. at 45?46. 
 15. Scalia himself might not have liked this term. See Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16 
CHAP. L. REV. 325, 341 (2013) (coining the term to critique the challengers to the Affordable Care Act as focused 
on ?moving the Constitution towards original meaning without even arguing that non-originalist precedents 
should be overturned?). 
 16. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1971). 
17. Id.
 18. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) 
(critiquing the Court?s frequent failure to articulate such principles in its decisions). 
 19. Bork, supra note 16, at 23 (applying his concepts to First Amendment law). 
20. Id. at 17. 
 21. At least in a limited form, nonoriginalists did not necessarily see this principle as all that controversial. 
Paul Brest described a rather limited debate between moderate originalists ?who acknowledge[] that the text and 
original history are often indeterminate . . . [b]ut adjudication may not proceed in the absence of authorization 
from some original source, and when the text or original history speaks clearly it is binding,? and nonoriginalists, 
who treat ?the text and original history as presumptively binding and limiting, but as neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for constitutional decisionmaking.? Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 237?38 (1980). 
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theory.22
The Reagan Administration made the theory more explicit?and more political. In 
1985, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ??? ??????????????? ??????? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ????????? ???????? ???
const????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ??????????23 While 
???????? ???????? ???????? ????????? ?????????? ?????????????? ??? ??????????? ???????? ???
?????????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???????24 Meese 
confidently ?????????? ????? ????? ???????? ??? ???? ????????????? ???? ??? ???????25 His 
prescription for knowing it, however, was limited: specific language should be obeyed; 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
least not cont????????????????????????????????????????????26
Justice Scalia, confirmed to the Supreme Court in 1987, was similarly modest about 
the potential of originalism????????? ??? ????? ??????? ??????????? ???????????? ?????????? ???
terms of broad constitutional ?????????????????? ???????????? ?????????????? ?????????27 He 
???????? ????????? ????? ?????????????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??? ????????? ???
?????????????????????? ????? ??? ?????? ????????????????????????????? ??? ?????????????? ????? ????
????????28 He furthe??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????? stare decisis and perhaps even with it, and that there is often little 
??????????? ???????? ???? ??????-???????? ???????????? ???? ????????? ???????????????? ???
practice.29 Although Scalia favored originalism because its chief weakness?the difficulty 
of historical research??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????-?????????????????????30 Indeed, 
                                                          
22. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695 (1976) 
(bemoaning living constitutionalism as ?the substitution of some other set of values for those which may be 
derived from the language and intent of the framers?). 
 23. Edwin Meese, III, U.S. Att?y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47?54 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). 
 24. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), in
ORIGINALISM, supra note 23, at 55, 58 (?One cannot help but speculate that the chorus of lamentations calling 
for interpretation faithful to ?original intention? . . . must invariably come from persons who have no familiarity 
with the historical record.?). The most important article out of the academy regarding originalism that year argued 
that it did not matter because the Founders did not intend for future generations to seek to discern their intent. H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 885 (1985). But see 
Jack Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 159, 160?61 (1996) 
(describing extensive and serious criticism of Powell?s conclusions). For a more detailed near-contemporaneous 
summary of the academic debate, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989). 
 25. Edwin Meese, III, U.S. Att?y Gen., Speech Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers 
Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 23, at 71, 74?75. 
26. Id. at 76. 
 27. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989). 
 28. Id. Scalia commended an opinion by Chief Justice Taft that he saw as originalist, identified its gaps, and 
cited sources that Taft could have used to fill them. 
29. Id. at 861?62 (?It is, I think, the fact that most originalists are faint-hearted and most nonoriginalists are 
moderate . . . which accounts for the fact that the sharp divergence between the two philosophies does not produce 
an equivalently sharp divergence in judicial opinions.?). This difference between originalism-as-theory and 
originalism-in-practice may be attributed to the fact that originalism-as-theory was largely as a force of political 
reaction, while originalism-in-practice was largely in keeping with traditional approaches to judging (as 
evidenced by, for example, Scalia?s discussion of the Taft opinion). See infra Part VIII. 
30. Id. at 864 (referring to his reluctance to uphold a statute that would impose flogging as a punishment even 
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 37 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 37 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
TEACHOUT, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 2:06 PM 
68 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:63 
even though he later professed to have abandoned such faint-heartedness,31 it is this 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
B. Critiques: Recognizing History’s Limits
??????? ???????? ??????? ???????? ??????? ???? ????????????? ??? ???ginalism, the most 
familiar critique of the theory is that its proponents elide the difficulty of neutral, honest 
application. Recognition of its limits, however, has strengthened its appeal. Over the past 
twenty years, a consensus has begun to emerge that, at least in some sense, we are all 
originalists. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ????????? ??? ??????? ??????? ???? ???????32 ?????? ??????? ????????? ???? ????? ?????? ????
decisions of 1787-88 embedded a particular set of binding meanings into the fabric of the 
??????????????33 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
particularly egregious mis?????????? ??? ?????34 Similarly, in 1999, natural law theorist 




???? ??? ???????????????????????? ??????? ????? ???????????? ???? ??????? ????????????? ??? ????
corr?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for the judiciary.36 Finally?and most relevant here?Bernadette Meyler in 2006 
                                                          
if there was evidence it was neither cruel nor unusual in the Founding era). 
 31. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 4, 2013), http:// 
nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/ (?I described myself as that a long time ago. I repudiate 
that. . . . I try to be an honest originalist! I will take the bitter with the sweet!?). 
 32. Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to it), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1592 n.14 (1997). 
33. Id. at 1609 (?As a theory of fidelity through history, originalism ultimately fails because it is false to the 
history it purports to describe.?). 
34. Id. at 1589 (citing as one example how historians can explain why Justice Scalia was mistaken to rely on 
the Declaration of Rights of Massachusetts of 1780 as evidence of how the 1787 drafters of the Constitution felt 
about the separation of powers). Other historians have similarly noted that lawyer?s history is inherently 
limited?given constraints of time, resources, and expertise, not to mention the limits of historical sources, courts 
cannot be expected to produce history with sufficient rigor to justify the claim that originalism is a neutral 
approach to the law. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular 
Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 296 (2011) (arguing 
that public meaning originalism has not solved the problem of the absence of rigorous historical work in the 
movement); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1708 (examining the 
differences between ?lawyer?s histories? and ?history?). 
 35. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611?13, 645 (1999) (arguing 
that originalism is ?now the prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation? even though no one had written 
?a definitive formulation? of the theory). 
 36. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL?Y 599, 611 (2004). To Whittington, 
this was particularly important in light of the ?passage? of the ?old originalism? to a ?new? 1990s version that 
was ?more comprehensive and substantive? than the old?and less inclined to judicial restraint (a shift that can 
be seen in Scalia?s rhetorical abandonment of his own faint-heartedness). Id. at 603?06, 608?10. This ?new?
originalism focused on original public meaning rather than original intent. The vigorous debate over whether this 
approach does justice to history continues. Compare Jonathan Gienapp, Constitutional Originalism and History,
PROCESS (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.processhistory.org/originalism-history/, and Jonathan Gienapp, Knowing 
How vs. Knowing That: Navigating the Past, PROCESS, (Apr. 4, 2017), with Randy Barnett, Challenging the 
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2019] ON ORIGINALISM’S ORIGINALITY 69 
?????????? ???????? ???? ????????????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ??????????-century 
common law on both sides of the Atlantic.37??????????????????????????????????? ????????????
Commentaries was a comprehensive Founding-era summary of a single, universal body of 
common law,38 the field was dramatically in flux at the time.39 Meyler thus proposed 
abandon???? ??? ???????????? ????????? ????? ?????cular, decontextualized answers?40 and 
???????? ?????? ???? ??????? ???? ??? ????????? ???? ??????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ???????????
constitutional concepts, debates whose contours may shift over time, like the common law 
itself??41
Synthesizing these ideas leads to the concept of incremental originalism. This 
approach readily admits that interpretation requires judgment, but uses history?including 
original intent and original public meaning?to set the boundaries of debate. Willingness 
to create exceptions and admit limits is not the same as abandonment of principle. 
Incrementalism is the foundation of stare decisis, a principle that Scalia admitted i?????
pragmatic exception?? ??? ???? ??????????42 that ensures originalism will not result in a 
??????????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ???????????? ????? ???????? ????? ????? ????? ????????????
originalism is the approach that Scalia took in his Fourth Amendment jurisprudence?
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
II. THE FOUNDERS? FOURTH AMENDMENT
A cursory review of research done by legal historians, let alone a careful examination 
of Founding-era primary sources, reveals that the original intent and original public 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment are incredibly difficult to discern with sufficient 
certainty to justify any firm conclusions about how the Founders would have decided a 
particular case. This Part conducts just such a cursory review of that research, from the 
common law antecedents in the decades leading up to the American Revolution through 
the drafting and ratification of state constitutions and the federal Constitution to the 
drafting and ratification of the Fourth Amendment. It relies in particular on the 
monumental work of William J. Cuddihy, whose dissertation Justice Sandra Day 
????????? ??????? ????? ??? ????????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ???? ????????????????? ??? ????
                                                          
Priesthood of Professional Historians, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/28/challenging-the-priesthood-of-
professional-historians/. 
 37. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 551 (2006) (arguing 
the common law should ?supply[] the terms of a debate about certain concepts, framing questions for judges but 
refusing them to settle them definitively?). 
38. Id. at 560?61. 
39. Id. at 567?72. The Founders themselves disputed both the importance and content of the common law 
and distinguished the American and English traditions. Id. Meyler saw this not as a reason to attack originalism, 
?but rather [to] encourage its metamorphosis into a more dynamic creature, one with appeal to both originalists 
and living constitutionalists.? Id. at 552. 
40. Id. at 593. 
41. Id. at 600. 
 42. SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 140 (writing in response to Lawrence Tribe?s
critique of his use of stare decisis); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 411?14 (2012). 
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??????? ??????????????????????????43 Yet even his work leaves questions unanswered.44
As such, this Part shows that, if any conclusion may be drawn from study of the history of 
the context, drafting, and ratification of the Fourth Amendment, it is that the Founders 
cared most about the broad principle the Supreme Court has repeatedly cited: government 
intrusion must be carefully limited and regulated. 
A. Transatlantic Common Law 
To understand the context from which the Fourth Amendment emerged, one must 
begin with the long path toward revolution. Conventional accounts begin with the growing 
hostility toward general warrants45 on each side of the Atlantic in the years leading up to 
1776 and conclude with ratification of the Fourth Amendment.46
1. The Colonies 
For the first half of the eighteenth century, an array of laws allowed search and 
seizure in the colonies either without a warrant or, at most, with a general warrant.47
Warrantless searches and seizures were nonetheless rare.48 Customs searches were most 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the colonies.49 Massachusetts, a hotbed of resistance to searches, became the first colony 
to require specific warrants for many types of searches in 1756. That requirement was 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
collectors to question citizens about their consumption of spirits, would lead collectors to 
search their homes as well.50 Privacy as much as physical safety thus motivated public 
opposition.51
But it was in 1761 that agitation in the colonies over general warrants came to a head 
with the Massachusetts controversy over writs of assistance. These writs were issued by a 
court to validate the authority of customs officers to conduct searches at will but were 
                                                          
 43. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669?71 (1995) (O?Connor, J., dissenting) (conducting 
an originalist analysis of individualized suspicion). Curiously, the Court?s opinion, which looked to 
reasonableness, was written by Justice Scalia. Id. at 652?57. 
44. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 571 (1999). 
 45. In contrast to modern particularized warrants, general warrants allowed government officials to search 
any number of houses and persons for potentially incriminating evidence. 
46. See generally WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING,
602?1791 (2009); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L.
REV. 361, 362?66 (1921). 
 47. Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 
939?41 (1997). 
 48. Thomas K. Clancy, The Importance of James Otis, 82 MISS. L.J. 487, 491 (2013). They were particularly 
rare relative to England: ?New England had only about half as many statutory categories of promiscuous search 
and seizure as had old England,? and that region had more than the remainder of the colonies. CUDDIHY, supra
note 46, at 228. 
 49. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 253. For instance, in 1728, a customs officer and his men ?twice went on a 
rampage of searches? of houses, warehouses, and ships, seizing contraband and non-contraband alike and 
threatening to shoot citizens in the process. Id. at 358. 
 50. Maclin, supra note 47, at 943?44. 
 51. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 356?57. 
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 39 Side A      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 39 Side A      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
TEACHOUT, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 2:06 PM 
2019] ON ORIGINALISM’S ORIGINALITY 71 
time-limited by the death of the sovereign.52 Thus, when George II died in 1760, customs 
officials were required to apply for new writs???????????????????????????????????????????
James Otis petitioned the Massachusetts Superior Court to deny them on the ground that 
general warrants were unconstitutional and only specific warrants were allowed.53 Otis 
complained that the writs made a citizen ??????????????????????????????????????????54 The 
???????? ?????? ???????? ??????? ???????????? ??out use of the writs in England and, upon 
????????? ??????????????? ???????????????????? ??????????? ??????????? ???? ?????????????? ??? ????
??????????55 Although Otis lost, his arguments energized the public such that he 
successfully pushed the Massachusetts legislature to pass a bill (which was controversially 
vetoed) requiring particularized warrants in many circumstances,56 and colonial courts 
began to decline granting writs of assistance.57
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there, the Child 
????????????? ?????????58 But even if it catalyzed the path to revolution, it did not directly 
inform the text of the Fourth Amendment. The case was mentioned only once in the 
debates over the Constitution and Bill of Rights.59 Nonetheless, it was clearly part of a 
developing consensus against general warrants motivated by the politics of the time, a 
dramatic increase in the types and number of searches and seizures, and the violence 
accompanying them.60
2. England 
Contemporaneously, a series of trespass cases brought by John Wilkes and his 
supporters served as the locus of opposition to general warrants in England. Fragmentary 
opposition to general warrants dated back centuries but crystalized into categorical outrage 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
alleged political libels.61 Wilkes was a member of parliament and publisher of a satirical 
newspaper whose attacks on George III earned him a charge of seditious libel in 1763.62
                                                          
 52. Maclin, supra note 47, at 945. 
53. Id. at 946. See also Davies, supra note 44, at 561. Otis had been the chief attorney of Massachusetts and 
resigned his office for the purpose of attacking the writs on behalf of Boston merchants. The merchants may have 
had additional reasons for opposing the writ beyond the principle of liberty, given the legal device was designed 
to fight smuggling. See CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 381, 397. 
 54. Davies, supra note 44, at 578. 
 55. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 
979, 993 (2011) (quoting THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY,
FROM 1749 TO 1774, 93?94 (1828)).  
 56. Maclin, supra note 47, at 946?47. 
 57. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 513?26, 533?36. 
 58. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817), in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 244, 248 
(Little Brown and Co. ed., 1846). 
 59. Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
53, 76 (1996) (noting that Adams was writing with the benefit of more than a half-century of hindsight); see also 
Clancy, Intent, supra note 55, at 1011 (noting that mention of the English cases discussed below is notably absent 
from Adams? writing). 
 60. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 569. 
61. Id. at 439?40. 
 62. Davies, supra note 44, at 562. 
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The search for evidence was widespread and violent, including seizure of the entirety of 
??????????apers.63 In response, Wilkes sued the government officials who conducted the 
searches for trespass.64 The general warrant authorizing the search was rejected by the 
court as defense against the tort.65
Soon thereafter, in 1765, came the case that would become the best known in the 
colonies, Entick v. Carrington.66 That case also dealt with a search for evidence in support 
of a seditious libel charge.67 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????




Despite this strong language, Entick was limited to searches aimed at censorship of the 
press.69
Although full case reports of Entick and the other Wilkes cases were not published 
in the colonies until later, a Blackstone summary of the developments and other news 
?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ????????? ????????????
which reauthorized the general writ for customs searches.70 That combination proved 
highly inflammatory, and a consensus against general warrants among colonial judges 
developed.71 The controversy bubbled on into the Revolution. 
B. Revolutionary State Constitutions 
While there is relative consensus among legal historians about the slights that led 
the Founders to focus attention on the issue of search and seizure, there is considerable 
dispute about what they intended the Fourth Amendment to do about it?in large part 
because there is insufficient evidence available to justify strong conclusions. Many of 
these disputes focus on whether there is a warrant requirement or broad reasonableness 
standard and are therefore outside the scope of this Article.72 Of interest here is the 
                                                          
 63. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 441?43 (describing searches in the dead of night, seizure of all the papers of 
several individuals, and forty-nine arrests). 
 64. Wilkes v. Wood, [1763] 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.). 
65. Id. at 498?99. 
 66. [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.). 
67. Id. at 807?08. 
68. Id. at 817?18. The Founders seemingly neglected to note the opinion?s conclusion: the court nonetheless 
stands against libel, and that laws against it must be enforced, for ?tyranny is worse than anarchy, and the worst 
Government better than none at all.? Id. at 818. 
 69. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 455?58. 
 70. Davies, supra note 44, at 563?64. Highlighting the transatlantic nature of the controversies, James Otis 
in 1765 cited Blackstone?s earlier description in the Commentaries of the three key rights of Englishmen as being 
?the free enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property. Clancy, Otis, supra note 
48, at 498 (citing James Otis, A Vindication of the British Colonies (1765), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 558 (Bernard Bailyn, ed. 1965)). 
 71. Davies, supra note 44, at 566. 
72. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (arguing 
that the warrant clause does not impose a warrant requirement, but only prohibits general warrants, a position 
often called ?generalized reasonableness? construction); Maclin, supra note 47, at 955 (arguing that Amar?s
interpretation unjustly reduces the scope of the reasonableness clause, the more common ?warrant preference?
construction). 
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 40 Side A      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 40 Side A      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
TEACHOUT, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 2:06 PM 
2019] ON ORIGINALISM’S ORIGINALITY 73 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that language is at the center of the line of Justice Scalia opinions that created the modern 
?????????-???????????????73
The first appearance of the enumerated property clause was in the 1776 
Pennsylvania declaration of rights, which introduced its prohibition on general warrants 
????? ?????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??????? ??? ????? ???????????? ?????? ???????? ???????? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????74 Enumeration served both to link the right to 
the property interests paramount under common law and to functionally limit the places 
where the right exists.75 Similar language appeared in the 1780 Massachusetts 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all his p????????????76 and the 1783 New 
Hampshire constitution copied that clause verbatim.77 That text, drafted by none other 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????78
Similar language was debated by the Continental Congress as it considered whether 
and how to forward the draft Constitution to the states for ratification. Henry Richard Lee 
of Virginia proposed Congress send a bill of rights, including a provision written in 
language borrowed from Adams?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ?????? ????????? ???????? ???????? ??? ??????????79 The 
language appeared repeatedly after the federal Constitution was drafted and published for 
ratification as part of the broader debate between Federalists and Antifederalists as to 
whether it was a good idea to include an enumerated list of the common law rights that the 
Constitution would preserve.80
Antifederalist writers widely decried the fact that the draft Constitution lacked an 
explicit prohibition on general warrants in language similar to the state declarations of 
rights, including the enumeration of places to be protected.81 Even an Antifederalist 
                                                          
73. See infra Part VI.D?F. However, the fact that neither Cuddihy nor any of the other authors cited herein 
discuss why these specific enumerated places were chosen suggests that the reasons may well be unknowable, 
itself a statement as to history?s limits. 
 74. Pa. Const. of 1776, art. X (Decl. of Rights). 
 75. Davies, supra note 44, at 680?81. 
 76. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIV. 
 77. N.H. Const. of 1783, pt. 1, art. XIX. 
 78. Clancy, Intent, supra note 55, at 1028. 
79. Id. at 1030, 1030 n.336. 
80. See CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 673 & nn.13?14. 
81. See, e.g., Centinel [Samuel Bryan], Centinel I, Indep. Gazetter (Phila.), October 5, 1787, reprinted in THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS 
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION, PART ONE: SEPTEMBER 1787 TO FEBRUARY 1788, at 52, 52?53
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (arguing that citizens will determine with their vote on ratification ?whether your 
houses shall continue to be your castles; whether your papers, your persons and your property, are to be held 
sacred and free from general warrants?); Centinel [Samuel Bryan], Centinel II, Freeman?s J. (Phila.), October 
24, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE, at 77, 89 (complaining the Constitution 
lacks a declaration ?[t]hat the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and possessions free 
from search or seizure,? and that general warrants are ?contrary to that right and ought not to be granted?); The 
Federal Farmer, Letter IV, October 12, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE, 274, 
279 (essential rights include the ?freedom from hasty and unreasonable search warrants, warrants not founded 
on oath, and not issued with due caution, for searching and seizing men?s papers, property, and persons?); A 
Columbian Patriot [Mercy Otis Warren], Observations on the Constitution, February 1788, reprinted in THE 
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argument stressing the importance of trial by jury raised general warrant searches as part 
of a parade of horribles that could be avoided through a jury trial guarantee?and did so 
in a way that graphically focused on the violence as well as the invasiveness of searches.82
In sum, these complaints were hodgepodge but broad, rendering it difficult to draw 
conclusions about intent or even public understanding in the era. 
Antifederalist grievances in turn duly made their way into the ratification convention 
debates.83 First, in Pennsylvania, the minority dissent noted that general warrants are 
??????????????????????????84 And in New York, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, 
ratification conventions passed a list of proposed amendments to the Constitution that each 
included a two-clause formulation, first expressing the right to be free from searches of 
persons and property, and second prohibiting the issuance of general warrants in violation 
of that right.85
C. The Bill of Rights 
The Antifederalist push for an enumerated Bill of Rights led the First Congress to 
consider a series of amendments to the Constitution, drafted by James Madison with an 
aim toward bringing moderate Antifederalists on board.86 ?????????? ?????? ???????
Amendment merged the two-clause form of the state declarations of rights and most of the 
ratifying convention proposals into a single clause that focused on the general warrant 
prohibition?though it still included the enumerated property list.87 It is noteworthy that 
                                                          
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS 
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION, PART TWO: JANUARY TO AUGUST 1788, at 284, 293 (Bernard 
Bailyn ed., 1993) (citing specifically and exclusively in a general complaint about the lack of a Bill of Rights 
?the insecurity in which we are left with regard to warrants unsupported by evidence,? which could lead to ?the 
insolence of any petty revenue officer to enter our houses, search, insult, and seize at pleasure?). See generally 
CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 673?80. 
 82. A Democratic Federalist, Reply to Wilson’s Speech, PENN. HERALD (Phila.), October 17, 1787, reprinted 
in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE, supra note 81, at 70, 73?74 (?Suppose . . . that a constable, 
having a warrant to search for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which there was a woman, and 
searched under her shift . . . in such cases a trial by jury would be our safest resource.?). 
83. See generally CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 680?86. 
84. Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, PENN. PACKET (Phila.), December 18, 1787, 
reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE, supra note 81, at 526, 533. 
85. Ratification of the Constitution by the Convention of the State of New York, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION PART TWO, supra note 81, at 536, 538 (declaring the ?right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches and seizures of his person, his papers or his property? and that general warrants are ?grievous and 
oppressive? and therefore should not be granted); Proposed Amendments by the Convention of the Delegates of 
the People of the State of Maryland, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART TWO, supra note 81,
at 552, 554 (proposing an amendment to declare that general warrants ?to search suspected places, or to seize any 
person, or his property, are grievous and oppressive . . . and ought not to be granted); Ratification Agreed to by 
the Convention of Virginia, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART TWO, supra note 81, at 557, 
560 (proposing an amendment to declare that ?every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches, and seizures of his person, his papers, and property,? and general warrants are dangerous and ought not 
to be granted); Declaration of Rights of the Convention of the State of North Carolina, reprinted in THE DEBATE
ON THE CONSTITUTION PART TWO, supra note 81, at 565, 567 (declaring that ?every freeman has a right to be 
secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person, his papers, and his property? and general 
warrants are dangerous and ought not to be granted). 
 86. CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at 704?12 (describing Madison?s plan to drive a wedge between ?hard-core 
Antifederalists? who sought to revise the Constitution into something more like the Articles of Confederation 
and moderates genuinely concerned about the lack of enumerated rights). 
 87. Davies, supra note 44, at 697 (?The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their 
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????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ??????????????????
writing, ra????? ????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ???????????? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????????
Committee of Eleven?perhaps in an attempt to ensure the amendment did not enshrine 
an unlimited right.88 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
draft into the two-clause form we know today is responsible for the aforementioned 
academic dispute over whether the amendment imposes a warrant requirement or a broad 
reasonableness standard.89 Ratification by the states came relatively quickly as the 
Antifederalist coalition broke down.90
* * * 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
original meaning of?or even an original intent for?the Fourth Amendment. Beyond a 
broad consensus that the Founders near-universally opposed general warrants and meant 
to prohibit them, it is unclear whether the Amendment was also meant to require warrants 
??? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ??????????????? ????????? ???? ?????????
whatever those might be. It is similarly murky whether the enumerated property clause 
was intended merely to tie the Amendment to the property interests paramount in common 
law or was also meant to draw limits around what rights it protected. What is clear, 
however, is that Antifederalist opposition to the Constitution led directly to the 
??????????????????????????????????????even if it did not as directly inform its content.91
To the extent that ratification of the Constitution was conditioned on enumerating the 
common law rights to be preserved, historical inquiry into the common law antecedents of 
the Fourth Amendment is essential to developing an originalist understanding of the right. 
???????? ?????? ????? ????? ??????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????? ????? ???? ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d dimensions developed in 
????????????????????92 The most important takeaway from this review of literature is that 
the project is too vast, and sources too sparse, for legal historians?let alone lawyers or 




????????? ???? ???????? ???????? ?????????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????? ???? ???
                                                          
papers, and their other property from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants 
issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be 
searched, or the persons or things to be seized.?). 
88. See id. at 706?15 (arguing the change was so intended). 
89. Id. at 716?24 (arguing that the Founders ?adopted the text as a specific response to a specific grievance 
[the general warrant] that had arisen in a specific historical context and had been shaped by a specific 
vulnerability in the protections afforded by common-law arrest and search authority?). But see Tracey Maclin, 
The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 209 (1993) (?The changes to 
Madison?s draft escaped the notice of members of the House and Senate, and the altered provision was approved 
by Congress and ratified by the state constitutional conventions without extensive discussion regarding the 
precise language of what later became the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.?). 
 90. CUDDIHY supra note 46, at 712?24. 
91. Id. at 725?26 (?Without the political urgency that Antifederalism imposed, Madison would not have 
written a right forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures.?). 
92. Id. at 670, 770. 
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 41 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 41 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
TEACHOUT, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 2:06 PM 
76 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:63 
sometimes treate????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
decisions in the 170 or so years prior to the realist revolution took an identical approach to 
Fourth Amendment law. For most of the nineteenth century and even the first decades of 
the twentieth, the Court?aiming to avoid erosion of the underlying common law right?
took a traditionalist approach that is not that dissimilar from what Justice Scalia suggested 
???? ?????????????? ?????????????? ????? ????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ???????? ??????Boyd v. 
United States, Weeks v. United States, and Gouled v. United States?that sketched the 
outlines of Fourth Amendment doctrine and served as a model of how the Court would 
use history in key Fourth Amendment cases going forward. 
A. Boyd v. United States (1886) 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
more than a century after ratification.93 From the beginning, then, the Court sought 
answers in history?and its effort in this regard remains to this day its most exhaustive. In 
Boyd v. United States, the Court answered the question whether an 1874 statute authorizing 
the search and seizure (or compulsory production) of private papers (customs invoices) 
violates the Fourth Amendment even though search and seizure of the contraband property 
itself (thirty-five cases of plate glass) did not.94 In making its decision, the Court applied 
two classical interpretive maxims: consuetudo est optimus interpres legume (custom is the 
best interpreter of the law) and contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege
(contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law). The Court concluded that 
???????? ?????? ??????? ???? ?????????????? ????????????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ?????????? ????
statute: the government is entitled to possession of stolen or forfeited goods or contraband 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????95
?????? ?????????? ?????????????? ???????????? ????????????????????? ??? ???????? ???????
both maxims are recognizable in principle. The first is in keeping with the traditions of 
common law judging and the second more or less analogous to original public meaning 
textualism. The majority in Boyd worked through both methods simultaneously, 
consulting sources from the then-recent past to determine what insight they could offer in 
either regard. This makes sense; given the recency of the sources consulted, even the 
??????? ???? ????????????? ????????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ????????????????? ??? ???????
originalism. To the Boyd Court, English and American common law antecedents both 
directly informed the original public meaning of the Fourth Amendment; the two 
interpretative maxims thus worked in tandem to create a cohesive common law originalist 
                                                          
 93. The Court?s first Fourth Amendment case came a decade earlier, but it was decided based on Congress?s
power to regulate the mails. See Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); see also infra note 129. 
 94. 116 U.S. 616, 617?18, 622 (1886). In modern terms, the question is whether a subpoena for papers 
proving possession of contraband violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when search and seizure of the 
contraband itself does not. 
95. Id. at 622. Contraband itself is different because the government, not the defendant, ?is entitled to 
possession of the property? at issue. Id. at 623. The same is true with regard to stolen goods, possession to which 
the victim of the crime is entitled. Id. at 625. Boyd thus formed the basis for the ?mere evidence? doctrine that 
reached its apogee in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and was overturned in Warden, Md. 
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (describing the rule as distinguishing search and seizure of ?items 
of evidential value only? from search and seizure of ?instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband?). See infra note 138 
and accompanying text. 
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analysis. 
Although the Court did not often differentiate between the types of sources it used 
in conducting its historical analysis, they may be grouped into three distinct types: pre-
Revolutionary English common law, colonial American law, and Founding-era legislation. 
While each of these sources is distinctive in terms of governmental structure, cultural 
assumptions, and other contexts, the fact that the Court blended the three into a cohesive 
analysis (the same way it conflated its two interpretive maxims) suggests that each was 
seen as an outgrowth of the one prior, da???????????????????????????????????????????????
This conclusion is strengthened by the order in which the Boyd Court proceeded with its 
analysis. The Court began by noting that even the colonial writs of assistance did not go 
as far as did the 1863 law at issue in the case, in stark contrast to the more limited searches 
long allowed by English statutes and common law.96 It then began its in-depth analysis 
with the customs statute passed by the First Congress, turned to the colonial writs of 
assurance controversy, and finally examined the near-contemporaneous developments in 
English common law that informed that colonial reaction.97
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
which the Court gave great interpretive credibi?????????????????????????????????????????
the same congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the 
??????????????98 The historical rigor underlying that selection is commendable; later 
opinions would, by contrast, muddle together decades worth of sources as 
?????????????????? ????? ???? ?????????99 Sections 23 through 26 of the 1789 statute 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
enter and search ships and vessels, and seize contraband.100 To the Boyd Court, that was 
?????? ????? ?????? ???????? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ???????? ???? ???????
Amendment.101 The Court noted that other contraband, like excisable goods (searchable 
??? ???????? ??????????? ????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ??? ????????? ??? ???????? ??
judgment, may also be searched and seized without a warrant.102 Highlighting how the 
Court glided between history and common law, the Court made this move with just one 
citation to an 1841 Massachusetts case on lottery tickets.103 After this litany, the Court 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????104
???? ?????? ????? ??????? ??? ????? ??????porary or then recent history of the 
                                                          
96. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623 & n.3. 
97. Id. at 623?29. 
98. Id. at 623. The Court also looked to the Judiciary Act of 1789 to bolster the conclusion that the First 
Congress believed that courts must determine when an individual would be forced to produce incriminating 
evidence, rather than allowing warrantless searches. Id. at 630?31. See also CUDDIHY, supra note 46, at lxvii 
(?The exclusion of most Congressional debates and other data beyond 1791 is intentional because such 
documentation reveals far less about what the amendment originally meant than about what it came to mean in 
the partisan blast furnace of the 1790s.?). 
99. See, e.g., infra notes 156?158 and accompanying text. 
 100. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 43 (regulating collection of the duties imposed by law on tonnage of 
ships or vessels and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into the United States). 
101. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623?24. 
102. Id. at 624. 
103. See id. (citing Massachusetts v. Dana, 2 Met. 329 (Mass. 1841)). 
104. Id. at 624. 
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??????????????? ????? ????????? ???? ????????? ?????? ??? ????? ???????? ???? ??? ??????????
apparently to discern original intent?????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
who achieved our independence and established ????????????????????????105 The Court 
began with a paragraph on the writs of assistance controversy.106 It quoted James Otis 
attacking the writs; cited the suits Otis brought against them, two treatises (one written by 
a member of the Court), and the memoirs of John Adams; and echoed Adams in describing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????107
Curiously, the Court looked much more closely at the English common law heritage 
than the contemporaneous events in the colonies.108 While describing an era that ran in 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1766, when the house of commons passed resolutions condemnatory of general 
??????????109 the Court focused the overwhelming majority of its attention to Lord 
????????? ????? ???????? ??? Entick v. Carrington,110 ?????????? ????? ??????? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
freedo???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????? ??????????
the fourth amendment to the constitution.?111 ?????????????????????????????????omewhat 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????? ??????? ???? ????? ?? ?????????112 The next 320 or so 
distinguish the act of search and seizure from stolen goods from seizure of papers.113
Following that is a roughly 235-word excerpt on the problem with compelling self-
accusation through compelled disclosure of papers (thus informing both the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment issues implicit in Boyd).114 The last forty-five words quoted are the 
holding.115
Perhaps because the largest block of quoted text deals with the nature of property?
and includes the rather striking statement ??????????he great end for which men entered into 
???????????????????????????????????????Boyd is often treated as a decision about property 
rights.116 Yet despite Lord Camden having given primacy of place to property rights, the 
Boyd ?????????????????????????????????????????????????g of his doors, and the rummaging 
                                                          
105. See id. at 625; see also supra notes 91?92 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra Part II.A.1. 
107. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625?26 & n.4.  
 108. Although this may be attributable to Blackstone making the history of the English common law much 
more readily available than colonial history, it could also be understood as a recognition that the Bill of Rights 
was intended to incorporate the common law, not replace it. See supra Part II.C. 
109. Boyd, 116 U.S at 625. 
 110. [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) (?The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their 
property.?). 
111. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626. Although this claim can today be easily documented, the Boyd Court made it 
without citation?perhaps because, little more than a century after the Founding, it felt like living memory. 
112. Id. at 627?28. 
113. Id. at 628?29. 
114. Id. at 629. 
115. Id.
116. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627 (quoting Entick, [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 807 (K.B.)). 
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of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his 
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property . . . which 
underlies and constitutes the essence o??????????????????????????117 It was to avoid that 
invasion that the Founders passed the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; as a result, they 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
had been engaged for more than 20 years would have been too deeply engraved in their 
memories to have allowed them to approve of such insidious disguises of the old grievance 
???????????????????????????????????118
The Court concludes its analysis with a strong statement about the importance of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
It may be that [the subpoena power at issue] is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least 
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that 
way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This 
can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of 
person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives 
them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted 
more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional 
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be 
obsta principiis.119
In short, after its historical analysis, the Court proceeded to reason from the history 
available to it, and in the process successfully captured the broad strokes of what the Fourth 
Amendment was designed to do?protect person and property from invasive government 
intrusion. 
A concurrence in Boyd is worth brief discussion because it sharply diverges from 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????e Bradley wrote for 
the Court about obsta principiis ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
concurred that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination prohibited use of the 
papers against the defendant, but wrote separately to express his view that no search nor 
seizure had occurred.120 Sounding almost like Justice Scalia, he worried that: 
If the mere service of a notice to produce a paper to be used as evidence, which the party can 
obey or not as he chooses, is a search, then a change has taken place in the meaning of words, 
which has not come within my reading, and which I think was unknown at the time the 
constitution was made.121
???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
only to abo?????????????????????? ??? ??????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ???
                                                          
117. Id. at 630. This statement neglects the reality that the physical violence inherent in colonial searches and 
seizures was a large source of opposition to the general warrant. See, e.g., supra notes 49, 63 and accompanying 
text. Nonetheless, what it gets right is the fact that Founding-era concerns were focused on privacy and security 
at least as much as property. 
118. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
119. Id. at 635 (emphasis added). The Court concludes its decision by running through conflicting opinions 
below. 
120. Id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring). 
121. Id. at 641. 
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search altogether.122 His is a far more restrained reading of the common law antecedents 
to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, making secondary the property concerns motivating 
the Court?? ???? ???????????? ???????? ???? ???????? ??????? ????????? ????????? ??? ?????????
????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the decades to follow. 
B. Weeks v. United States (1914) 
The next seminal Fourth Amendment case came nearly three decades later, in 1914. 
In Weeks v. United States, the Court answered the question whether papers seized by a 
United States ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
may be used as evidence.123 ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
intent, which the Court discerned by running through the historical work done by Boyd
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of the 
4th Amendment . . . is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might 
??? ???????????????????????????????????????124 Thus, the Court created the antecedent to the 
modern-day exclusionary rule that prohibits prosecutors from evidence collected in 
violation of a Fourth Amendment right.125
Weeks ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to reliance on precedent. Unlike in Boyd, the Court did not elaborate interpretive 
principles, but merely proceeds through precedent?albeit with an eye toward Founding-
era history. Rather than turning to Boyd for its precedential value, it considered the history 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of Rights to secu???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
warrants.126 Citing contemporary treatises, the Court explained that resistance to the writs 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4th Am???????????????? ??????????????????????????127 Here we see a clearer focus on the 
property-based rationale on which later decisions would explicitly rely, though the section 
of Boyd quoted in Weeks ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????rty, 
??????????????????????128
The Court also discussed two other cases. First, it mentioned Ex Parte Jackson, an 
1877 case where the Court held that letters and packages may not be opened without a 
warrant, despite the Constitutional power vested in Congress to establish post offices and 
roads, because papers that have been closed against inspection are to be secure from search 
and seizure wherever they may be located.129 The Court used Ex Parte Jackson to show 
                                                          
122. Id.
 123. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914). 
124. Id. at 393. 
125. Id. at 398. 
126. Id. at 390. 
127. Id.
128. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
 129. 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (?[A]ll regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination 
to the great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.?). In Ex Parte Jackson, the petitioner 
was before the Court on a Habeas challenge to the constitutionality of a law prohibiting obscene material in the 
mail on the originalist grounds that the power (and thus duty) to establish and regulate post offices and roads 
means that ?a letter or a packet which was confessedly mailable matter at the time of the adoption of the 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ????????
and sealed packages in the mail, suggesting that it is at pains to make clear that the 
boundaries of the protection are not drawn by the property line of the aforementioned 
castle.130
Second, the Weeks Court quoted from Bram v. United States, an 1897 case holding 
????? ?? ???????????? ??????????????? ???????????? ????????????? ??????????????????? but 
noting along the way, in discussing Boyd, that both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
contemplated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of a constitutional provision, 
principles of humanity and civil liberty which had been secured in the mother country only 
after years of struggle, so as to implant them in our institutions in the fullness of their 
integrity, free from the possibilities of future legislative change.131
This quotation was used (perhaps in part because Bram was authored by Justice Edward 
White, who had, by the time of Weeks, become Chief Justice White) to affirm the intent 
and principles underlying the Fourth Amendment. 
It is this mix of history and precedent that the Court relied on to conclude that the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????-seized papers were used as evidence?that 
??????????????????????????????? those great principles established by years of endeavor and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????132
The Court then applied this principle to distinguish the chief cases put forward by the 
government. In Adams v. New York, the Court had held that materials were admissible 
because they were seized incidentally during an otherwise-legal search, a different 
???????????????????????????????????????????????133 In Hale v. Henkel, the Court had merely 
held that subpoenas in general did not violate the Fourth Amendment?but the subpoena 
??? ?????? ???? ????? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ??? ???????????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ????
warrantless search in Weeks was unreasonable.134 These two cases each cited and 
discussed Boyd, but, like Weeks, did so in a way that mixed Boyd????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????135
                                                          
Constitution cannot be excluded from them.? Id. at 731. The Court rejected that argument, noting that there was 
no evidence in the record as to how the evidence was collected, and therefore, ?the only question for our 
determination relates to the constitutionality of the act; and of that we have no doubt.? Id. at 737. This seems to 
suggest the Court?s statements on the First and Fourth Amendment were technically dicta. Not only did the Court 
reject the petitioner?s originalist argument, it did very little historical work: The statements about the Fourth 
Amendment were based entirely in principle; related First Amendment commentary looked to an 1836 debate in 
Congress but not to the Founding era. Id. at 733?34. That would have to wait for Boyd.
130. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 343 (quoting Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733). 
 131. 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897). 
132. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393. 
133. Id. at 394?96 (discussing Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904)). 
134. Id. at 396?97 (discussing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 71?75 (1906)). 
135. See Hale, 201 U.S. at 71?75 (citing Boyd, which ?exhaustively considered? the construction of the Fourth 
Amendment, and a series of subsequent cases for the premise that it ?was not intended to interfere with the power 
of courts to compel, through a subpoena duces tecum, the production, upon a trial in court, of documentary 
evidence?); Adams, 192 U.S. at 598 (citing Boyd, which ?elaborately considered? the origin of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments, and, without citations, ?the English, and nearly all of the American, cases? for the premise 
that the Amendments were ?designed to prevent violations of private security in person and property and 
unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home,? but ?were never intended to have [the] effect? of prohibiting 
evidence discovered incidentally during an otherwise legal ?search for the instruments of crime? from being used 
as evidence). Note that the latter case again recognized that Boyd focused on privacy and security at least as much 
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While Weeks did not duplicate the primary source work of Boyd, it mirrored its goals 
and approach: it self-consciously turned to Founding-era history to reach conclusions 
about the principles and intent underlying the Fourth Amendment and apply them to the 
modern-day question at issue. What sets it apart is that it was not the first of its kind; as 
such, it has to consider precedent. Rather than opening with precedent and reasoning from 
there, however, it began with history and only then turned to precedent to see if it conflicts. 
C. Gouled v. United States (1921) 
The final case in the traditionalist era meriting discussion came soon thereafter, in 
1921. In Gouled v. United States, the Court answered the question whether a warrant may 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and an attorney bill allegedly related to the commission of a felony).136 The Court began 
both its opinion and the relevant section with the plain text of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, a look at how the Framers intended and viewed them, and how previous 
Courts had acted. While the Court relied heavily on Boyd, its reasoning was focused on 
the intent of the Founders, with common law precedent intermingled as a secondary 
consideration.137 This case was the high-??????????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????????? ??????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used 
???????????????????????????????????????????????138




?????????139 In so doing, it returned to Boyd???????????????????????????n of the right. The 
?????? ????? ?? ???????? ?????????????? ?????????? ??? ??????? ??? ????? ???????? ??? ???? ???????
??????????? ??? ???????? ???? ????? ????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ???? ???? ?????
constitutional warrant as the prohibition [on unreasonable searches a??????????????????140
????? ???????????????? ???? ?????? ?????? ???? ???????????? ???????????? ??? Boyd and Weeks,
                                                          
as property. 
 136. 255 U.S. 298, 306?08 (1921). The Court also held that entry ?obtained by stealth instead of by force of 
coercion? invades the ?security and privacy of the home or office and of the papers of the owner? just as much 
and ?must therefore be regarded as equally in violation of his constitutional rights.? Id. at 304?06. Again, note 
the appearance of violence and privacy alongside property. 
137. Id. at 303?04, 308?09 (citing Boyd, Weeks, and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 
(1920)). Silverthorne Lumber extended the exclusionary rule of Weeks to create the ?fruit of the poisonous tree?
doctrine without any resort to history; this would cut against an argument that cases in this era began with 
Founding-era thoughts but for the fact that Weeks had just six years earlier done that work and this very short 
opinion appears to take that for granted. 
138. Id. at 309. Likewise, use of such evidence at trial violated the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. Id. at 311. Even as Gouled provided the most clear articulation of the rule, countless exceptions 
were already in place, see, e.g., Hale, 201 U.S. at 74?75 (holding that a corporation, as ?a creature of the state,?
is subject to ?a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded 
its powers?; perhaps this was sufficient to give the government a property right in a corporation?s books), and 
many more proliferated after. 
139. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 303?04. 
140. Id. at 308. 
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which looked to the era in which the Constitution was adopted to find that search warrants 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? property liable to duties and 
concealed to avoid payment of them, excisable articles and books required by law to be 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????141
* * * 
By building on historical inquiry into common law antecedents and the Founding 
era, the Court looked to original intent as it set out the contours of its Fourth Amendment 
doctrine?a relatively robust privacy right. The Boyd rule prohibiting subpoenas of private 
papers (and, to some extent, the mere evidence rule as expounded in Gouled) outlined an 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Weeks exclusionary rule created 
a powerful mechanism by which that expectation could be enforced. 
IV. FORMALIST EROSION
As new technologies emerged and federal power grew during Prohibition, the Court 
began to limit the scope of Fourth Amendment. The Court limited its interpretation of 
Entick to a property-centric rationale, leaving behind the traditional rights-maximalist 
approach for a formalist (if not literalist) approach that focused on the enumerated list of 
protected places rather than on original intent.142 Three cases?Carroll v. United States,
which created the automobile exception, and Olmstead v. United States and Goldman v. 
United States?? ?????? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ??? ??? ????????????? ?????????
line?eroded the strong privacy right that had been established by the traditionalist Court. 
A. Carroll v. United States (1925) 
The beginning of the literalist period began in 1925, just five years after the 
Eighteenth Amendment took effect. In Carroll v. United States, the Court answered the 
question whether a warrantless search for contraband (here, liquor) in a vehicle violated 
the Fourth Amendment if conducted with probable cause.143 The question arose because 
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cause.144 The Carroll Court began its analysis not with constitutional principle or 
Founding-era history, but with examination of precedent.145 It gave lip service to the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will 
                                                          
141. Id.
142. See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in 
Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 573?81, 609?16 (1996) (arguing that Boyd is an example of the 
primacy of natural rights in the Lochner era). 
 143. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
144. Id. at 146?47. 
145. Id. at 147?49 (citing Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne Lumber, Gouled, and Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 
313 (1921)). Amos held that concealed liquor found in a defendant?s home during a warrantless search was 
inadmissible at trial because revenue officers had impliedly coerced his wife to gain entry in the defendant?s
absence. Like Silverthorne Lumber, the Court?s opinion in Amos relied entirely on precedential cases?Boyd,
Weeks, and Silverthorne Lumber?and the reasoning of Gouled, released the same day, rather than on history, 
Founding-era or otherwise. 
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????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
principles that underlie originalism.146 But its analysis relied entirely on precedent and 
interpretation of post-Founding statutes, and it concluded that construction of the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
holding147 that automobile searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
carrying contraband liquor.148
???????????????????????Carroll, written by Chief Justice Taft, began with the text of 
the Fourth Amendment and the portion of the National Prohibition Act at issue.149 It 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
make a distinction between the necessity for a search warrant in the searching of private 
dwellings and in that of automobiles and ?????? ????? ??????????150 and held that this 
distinction was reasonable.151 To provide rationale for that holding, the Court looked first 
to its own precedent, but concluded that none of the cases cited were on point regarding 
the validity of a warrantless seiz?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????152 ????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Court said that the ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????153
In support of its view that a search on probable cause was not considered 
unreasonable in the Founding era, the Court quoted from Boyd??????????????????????????
customs act. In the quoted passage, the Boyd Court ???????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????154 As noted above, the 
Boyd Court cited a series of things subject to warrantless search, but only provided 
Founding-era authority regarding contraband.155 Boyd looked to Founding-era law on 
contraband and customs papers to hold that the Founders could not have seen such searches 
as unreasonable, while the Carroll Court excerpted the same sources to distinguish 
contraband from mere evidence. And it is notable what the Carroll opinion does not quote 
from Boyd: it contained no reference to English or colonial common law, nor to Entick,
nor to its underlying principle of giving the Fourth Amendment a liberal construction. 
                                                          
146. Id. at 149. 
147. Id. at 149?53. 
148. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156. 
149. Id. at 143?44. 
150. Id. at 145?47 (referencing a Senate amendment that would have prohibited warrantless searches of any 
property, a House Judiciary Committee report expressing the view that such an amendment would ?greatly 
cripple? enforcement by prohibiting warrantless automobile searches, and the resulting Conference Report that 
prohibited warrantless search of a ?private dwelling? but allowed one of an ?automobile or vehicle of 
transportation? when it is ?not malicious or without probable cause?). As such, the automobile search exception 
was the product of both a Constitutional amendment and Congressional deliberation about how that amendment 
should be enforced. Query, then, whether it was inevitable that the exception would survive repeal of the 
amendment?and what it means that it has. 
151. Id. at 147. 
152. Id. at 149. 
153. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149. 
154. Id. at 284 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886)). 
155. See supra notes 102?104 and accompanying text. 
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 46 Side A      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 46 Side A      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
TEACHOUT, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 2:06 PM 
2019] ON ORIGINALISM’S ORIGINALITY 85 
The Carroll Court next buttressed its logic with similar provisions in related laws 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????? the decade that passed between that event 
and the passage of the last law.156 Then it walked through similar provisions in statutes 
????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????????? ???
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????157 Still further 
afield from the Founding, it referred to statutes allowing warrantless search and seizure on 
Indian territory (1820, 1834, and 1917) and in the Alaskan territory (1899).158 The 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ??????? ????????? ????? ????? ??? ???????? ???????159 But once again, the court 
extrapolated from statutes involving customs contraband and ships at a port of entry to 
make a broad conclusion about exigent circumstances more generally. It did not do original 
historical work to determine, for example, how contraband concealed in a saddlebag or on 
a buggy would have been treated in the Founding era. That makes sense as a matter of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
From there, the opinion took an outright consequentialist turn. The Court 
????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
national borders, but concluded all that is necessary to overcome that right it is probable 
cause.160 ???? ?????? ??????? ?????????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ???????????? ??? ????????????
searches on probable cause in determining that such searches are reasonable.161 Finally, 
the Court turned briefly to the common law to resolve a secondary issue: whether a seizure 
is limited by the common law tradition that one may only be arrested for a misdemeanor 
if it was committed ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1885 and 1900, a treatise on English law, and an 1850 case from the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court before dismissing the argument on the ground that arrest followed 
discovery of contraband (which was found during the search and seizure justified by 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????




of the car coming only thereafter?and noted that such an action was not authorized by the 
Prohibition Act, a law that McReynolds said intended to avoid warrantless search and 
seizure at least for first and second offenses, which were misdemeanors.163 Noting that 
????????? ????????? ???? ???????? ??? ??? ????????? ???????????? ??????????? ????? ?? ???????????
approach to distinguish the Prohibition Act from the statutes discussed by the Court, which 
                                                          
156. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150?51. 
157. Id. at 152. 
158. Id. at 152?53. 
159. Id. at 153. 
160. Id. at 154. 
161. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154?56. 
162. Id. at 157?59. 
163. Id. at 163?64 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
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???? ???????????? ?????????? ????????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????????164 And he issued a 
??????????? ???????? ????? ????? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ??????????????? ???? ????? ???? ????????
op???????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ???????????? ??????????????????????????
highway, take articles away from him and thereafter use them as evidence to convict him 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????165 Though McReynolds 
was hardly an ally of Justice Brandeis,166 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
vigorous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.
B. Olmstead v. United States (1928) 
The classic Fourth Amendment case in the formalist era was decided in 1928. In 
Olmstead v. United States, the Court answered the question whether warrantless wiretaps 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Fourth Amendment.167 ?????? ???? ???????? ????????? ??? ???? ?????-known historical 
pur?????168 of the Amendment, its analysis is focused on precedential opinions (five of 
them the same as those cited in Carroll; the sixth a decision released shortly after it).169
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????usionary 
rule create by Weeks ?????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
in Gouled,170 ???? ?????? ???????? ?? ???????? ??????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????arch is to be of 
????????? ????????? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ????? ???????????? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ?? ??????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????????????171
This sharp turn toward literalism is the most striking thing about Olmstead. The 
Court stated witho??? ????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???????? ????? ???? ?????-known historical 
????????? ??? ???? ????????????????? ????? ??? ???????? ???? ???? ??? ????????????? ?????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
against his ??????172 Focusing on the enumerated list allowed the Court to limit protections 
                                                          
164. Id. at 166?67. 
165. Id. at 169. Justice McReynolds was particularly exercised by the facts of the case, quoting the arresting 
officer?s testimony in its entirety and expressing disbelief about the notion that an arrest two and a half months 
after the event giving rise to suspicion could amount to probable cause: ?Has it come about that merely because 
a man once agreed to deliver whisky, but did not, he may be arrested whenever thereafter he ventures to drive an 
automobile on the road to Detroit!? Id. at 174. Though Justice Scalia speculated in 2013 that he may someday be 
regarded as ?the Justice Sutherland of the late-twentieth and early-21st century,? Senior, supra note 31, here one 
can see some overlap with McReynolds. 
166. See Adam Liptak, Stevens, the Only Protestant on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2010), 
https://nyti.ms/2FvI7Ca (repeating the story, apocryphal story, of McReynolds? refusal to sit next to Brandeis for 
the Court?s 1924 portrait). 
 167. 277 U.S. 438, 455?57 (1928) (explaining how a series of taps collected evidence disclosing ?a conspiracy 
of amazing magnitude?), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
168. Id. at 463 (doing no historical work to support its claim). 
169. Id. at 458?62 (discussing Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne Lumber, Amos, Gouled, and Agnello v. United 
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)). The Olmstead Court?s discussion and quotation of Boyd focused on the sections of 
that opinion devoted to statutory interpretation of the 1874 act with regard to the Fifth Amendment, not the 
sections discussing Founding-era history or its common law antecedents. See id. at 458?59. 
170. Id. at 462?64. 
171. Id. at 464, 466. 
172. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463. Note that the language again is tinged with the threat of violence?use of 
force against a citizen?s will. That said, the closest the Court comes to considering whether this is in fact true is 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Gouled (which involved 
???????? ?????????? ???? ???????? ????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ????? ?? ????????173 More 
dubiously, the Court additionally distinguished the sealed letters in Ex Parte Jackson in 
part on the ground that the government holds a monopoly on the carriage of letters, but 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????174
Quoting Carroll???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????175 the Court 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????mployed 
beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to 
?????? ?????????? ?????????????????????? ??? ?????????????????? ???????176 A person making 
????????????????? ????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ??? ?????????????????????????
??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ?????????177
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
devoted to a direct attack on Weeks?? ?????????? ??? ????????? ????????? ?????????????? ????
precedent cited.178 And the one case it added to the five cited in Carroll was Agnello v. 
United States, in which the Court applied the exclusionary rule to overturn a conviction 
based on the use of unconstitutionally-seized drug contraband as evidence at trial.179
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ror that 
this carefully-collected evidence would go to waste?a strikingly consequentialist factor 
for a formalist Court to consider. 
The sole place the Court considered traditional common law rather than its own 
precedent was with regard to Weeks. The Court argued that Weeks was in contrast to 
????????????????-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????? ????????????????????180 This difference was used to reject the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????nce should be excluded on the grounds that it 
???????????????????????????he Weeks ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
only for purposes of evidence collected unconstitutionally; in cases of routine illegality, 
the common law rule must still apply.181 Once again, the Court turned consequentialist, 
                                                          
in reference to precedent, not Founding-era history: 
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our attention hold 
the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant, unless there has been an official 
search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an 
actual physical invasion of his house ?or curtilage? for the purpose of making a seizure. 
Id. at 466. 
173. Id. at 463?64. 
174. Id. at 464. 
175. Id. at 465 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149). 
176. Id. at 465?66. 
177. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465?66. 
178. See id. at 460. 
 179. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (relying on Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne Lumber, and Gouled,
while distinguishing Carroll because the contraband at issue in Agnello was seized from a home, not a vehicle). 
180. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 462?63 (citing the same 1841 state law case as Boyd had to support the view that 
?the only remedy open to a defendant whose rights under a state constitutional equivalent of the Fourth 
Amendment had been invaded was by suit and judgment for damages,? and Entick). 
181. Id. at 467 (citing state law cases and a treatise in support). 
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
TEACHOUT, B - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 2:06 PM 
88 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:63 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
other than nice ethical conduct by government officials, would make society suffer and 
give criminals greater im???????????????????????????????????????182
??? ?????? ????????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????? ??????? ???????? ?????????? ????-known 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ?????????? ?????183 ????????? dissent presci?????? ??????? ????? ???? ???????? ???????????
would allow new technology to erode Fourth Amendment protections.184 To Brandeis, the 
historical purpose of the Amendment was not merely to prevent physical intrusion into a 
tangible space or physical violence against a person or their property, but rather to address 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and violence were then the only means known to man by which a government could 
directly effect self-???????????????? ???? ??????????? ????? ???? ????? ???? ??????????
manifestation of an aim to prevent that particular evil.185 ????????????????????????????? ????
far-????????? ?????? ??? ????????? ?????????186 ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????urth Amendment?as Boyd had illustrated.187 This 
application of Boyd seems very familiar to the modern reader, but is quite different from 
???? ???????? ???? ??? ???? ????? ???? ???? ?????????? ??????????????? ??? ???? ????? ???????? ???? ???
issue.188 Brandeis marshaled a litany of other authorities to support this view, including 
both precedent189 and Founding-era history and its common law antecedents.190
Just as the Court in Weeks ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
. . ??????????????????????????????????????nary rule,191 and Justice McReynolds had worried 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Carroll rule,192 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
????????????? ??????????????????????193 Thus?although the Olmstead Court criticized 
                                                          
182. Id. at 468. 
183. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). While Brandeis expressed this thought most famously, Justice Field 
had made a similar case when he was a district court judge with language that eventually made its way into a 
Supreme Court decision: ?Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his 
peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of his person 
from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. 
Without the enjoyment of this right, all other rights would lose half their value.? In re Pac. Ry. Comm?n, 32 F. 
241, 250 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887), quoted in Interstate Commerce Comm?n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894). 
184. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
185. Id. at 473. Brandeis? understanding of the right dates at least as far back as an 1890 law review article he 
published with Samuel Warren advocating for a common law right to privacy in tort. Samuel D. Warren & Louis 
D. Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (describing the term ?property? as comprising 
?intangible, as well as tangible? things). 
186. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
187. Id. at 473?76 (quoting the ?not the breaking of his doors . . . but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right 
of personal security, personal liberty and private property? passage from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
630 (1886)). 
188. See id. at 458?59; see also supra note 169. 
189. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 477?78 (citing Ex Parte Jackson, Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne Lumber, Gouled,
Amos, Angello, Hale, and Carroll, among others). 
190. Id. at 474 (citing James Otis and Lord Camden). 
 191. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). 
 192. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 169 (1925) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
193. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. 
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Weeks for breaking with tradition by abandoning the common law?the real departure was 
in Olmstead, where the Court abandoned principle grounded in history for literalism 
grounded in precedent. 
C. Goldman v. United States (1942) 
Although Olmstead was controversial as soon as it was handed down, it survived for 
decades and was reaffirmed in a closely related case in 1942. In Goldman v. United States,
the Court ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
the Fourth Amendment.194 The Court interpreted Section 605 of the 1934 
Communications Act, which Congress passed in the aftermath of Olmstead to limit the use 
of evidence collected via warrantless wiretapping: because the microphone picked up the 
spoken words from next door, not from a telephone wire, the Act did not apply.195 To 
resolve the constitutional issue, the Court straightforwardly applied Olmstead, providing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????196
While the Court in Goldman did no new historical research and the dissent only 
made passing references to it, the case is useful as the source of three types of evidence 
that belie any notion that Olmstead was noncontroversial. 
The first is the fact that, six years after the decision was handed down (and little over 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
had limited the scope of what surveillance was permissible. Section 605 prohibited 
telecommunications company employees from divulging a communication to anyone 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or 
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted 
?????????????????????????????197 In 1937, the Supreme Court interpreted that provision 
to prohibit federal agents from testifying in court about intercepted communications, even 
though other bills intended to prohibit warrantless wiretapping altogether had not 
passed.198 The Court found no relevant legislative history to determine Congressional 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Congress to adopt section 605 as evoked the guaranty against practices and procedures 
violative of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the 
?????????????199?a connection that provided the rationale for Katz v. United States to 
overturn Olmstead three decades later. The decision was issued over a dissent by Justices 
McReynolds and Sutherland, who were in the Olmstead majority and took a similarly 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
 194. 316 U.S. 129, 131?32 (1942). 
195. Id. at 133?34. 
196. Id. at 135. 
 197. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1934). 
 198. Nadrone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937). 
199. Id. at 383. 
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crime is being submerged ??????????????????????????????????200
The second source making clear the controversial nature of Olmstead is a passage at 
the end of Goldman:
That case was the subject of prolonged consideration by this court. The views of the court, 
and of the dissenting justices, were expressed clearly and at length. To rehearse and 
reappraise the arguments pro and con, and the conflicting views exhibited in the opinions, 
would serve no good purpose. Nothing now can be profitably added to what was there 
said.201
That made quick work of the suggestion that Olmstead be overturned. 
The third source illustrating the uneasiness about Olmstead are the two dissents in 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????een happy to 
???????? ??????? in overturning Olmstead, but, having failed to achieve one, saw no reason 
to repeat the dissenting views from that case.202 Second, Justice Murphy (citing Entick v. 
Carrington alongside Boyd ??????????????????????????Olmstead???????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the rule or practice of this Court to permit the scope and operation of broad principles 
ordained by the Constitution to be restricted, by a literal reading of its provisions, to those 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????203 Taking the same sort 
of original intent approach as the Boyd ??????? ??????? ????????? ????? ??????????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????era ???????????????????????????????????????????? to 
??????? ???? ??????? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????? ???? ???????? ??? ?????
???????????????????????204
* * * 
The key cases of the formalist era?Carroll, Olmstead, and Goldman?established 
a literalist interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. But each saw vigorous dissents; the 
first two at a time when dissent was relatively rare. Each of those dissents applied 
Founding-???? ??????????? ??? ??????? ???? ???????? ??????????? ???????? ????? ???? ????????????
crabbed reading of the Fourth Amendment was controversial even at the time. And, though 
Carroll survives in a different form to this day, Olmstead and Goldman would soon be 
overturned. 
V. REALIST REACTION
Castigated by originalists for lack of faithfulness to the original text of the 
Constitution,205 the Warren Court nonetheless halted the literalist erosion of the privacy 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
places clause. Although the Goldman Court announced fourteen years after Olmstead that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
200. Id. at 387 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
201. 316 U.S. at 136. 
202. Id. at 136 (Frankfurter, J. & Stone, C.J., concurring). 
203. Id. at 138 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
204. Id. at 138?39 (?Surely the spirit motivating the framers of that Amendment would abhor these new 
devices no less.?). 
205. See supra Part I.A. 
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the Court to obliquely do just that. Katz v. United States, the key Warren Court decision 
????? ???????? ??????????????????????? ???? ???????????? ????????????????????????? ?????? ????
recent cases (Silverman v. United States and Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden) as 
evidence that the Court had moved so far away from the literalism of Olmstead that it was 
no longer controlling. In so doing, the Court arguably acted in a manner more in keeping 
with the original intent approach of the Boyd Court than it had done in the formalist 
decisions above. 
A. Silverman v. United States (1961) 
The first key Warren Court case to draw a line against the formalist position came 
in 1961. In Silverman v. United States, the Court answered the question whether 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Fourth Amendment.206 The Court self-??????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????207 The Court distinguished 
Olmstead and Goldman??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ??? ?????????????????????? ???????????????????? ?? ??????????????????????????? ??????208
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
protected a??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????209
At a glance, Silverman seems to have followed a property-based rationale. But the 
reality?as it was in Boyd???? ????? ????????? ???? ?????? ??????? ????????? ????? ????????
Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real 
????????? ?????210 citing Hester v. United States, which found no Fourth Amendment 
violation for a technical trespass onto open fields,211 On Lee v. United States, which found 
no violation when a defendant invited an undercover agent onto his property, even if it 
was a technical trespass ab initio,212 and a series of cases in which defendants were found 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????213 Adding to this confusion, 
Justices Clark and Whittaker concurred on the grounds that the physical penetration 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????214 while Justice Douglas 
?????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ???????? ????? ????? ???????? ??? ???? ????????? ?????????? ??th 
????????????????????????????????????????215
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
 206. 365 U.S. 505, 506?07 (1961). 
207. Id. at 509. 
208. Id. at 510. 
209. Id. at 512. 
210. Id. at 511. See also id. at 512 (?But decision here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a 
party wall as a matter of local law.?). 
 211. 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
 212. 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (doubting that ?the niceties of tort law initiated almost two and a half centuries ago 
. . . are of much aid in determining rights under the Fourth Amendment?). 
 213. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. 
United States, 335 US. 451 (1948). 
214. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (Clark, J., concurring). 
215. Id. at 512 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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right was set aside in Katz,216 it is important to note that Silverman marked the first time 
????????????????????????????????????endment jurisprudence?all four previous uses, two 
by the Court and two in dissents, were in the context of the First Amendment.217
Moreover, it was used only four times with regard to the Fourth Amendment before Katz
moved away from it?and two of those four ??????????????????????????????????????????????
applied.218
The takeaway from Silverman is that it was quite self-???????????????????????????????
????????219 ????????? ????? ????? ??? ?????? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ?????? ????????? ??? ???? ???????
Amendment. The Court cited Entick ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????Boyd??? ????????obsta principiis.220
And it closed with the statement that, while the Court would not re-examine Goldman, it 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????221 Thus, even though Katz 
repudiated the Silverman ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
case can be se??????????????????????????????????????????????-plus test?one that kept an 
easy case easy by concluding that a trespass had occurred. 
B. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967) 
The second key case of the realist era came in 1967, the same year as Katz. In 
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, the Court reconsidered?and eliminated???????????
???????????????222 Rather than revisit primary sources, the Court cited sections from three 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????ry and 




not occur without a look at Founding-era sources and their common law antecedents. Next, 
the Court walked through the erosion of property interests in Fourth Amendment 
                                                          
216. See infra Part V.C. 
217. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 100 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 
360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 104 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting); Carpenters & 
Joiners Union of Am., Local No. 213 v. Ritter?s Café, 315 U.S. 722, 734 (1942). 
218. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); Lopez 
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142 (1962). 
219. Cf. Job 38:11. 
220. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511?12. 
221. Id. at 512. 
 222. 387 U.S. 294, 295?96 (1967). 
223. Id. at 301 (citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481?85 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrants of Prop. at 
104 E. Tenth St., Kansas City, Mo., 367 U.S. 717, 724?29 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 362?65 
(1959)). The first two cases looked at length to English and colonial history?including, of course, the Wilkes 
cases?to review how the amendment interacted with the principle of press freedom. The third depicted the 
amendment?s protections against official invasion as focused on privacy and self-protection. The fact that the 
Court did extensive historical research to justify the conclusion that the amendment was grounded in the right to 
privacy refutes the notion that the legal realists were purely consequentialist. 
224. Warden, 387 U.S. at 301 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
225. Id. at 301?02. 
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jurisprudence,226 and concluded with the consequentialist take that the transition to a 
privacy-?????? ????? ???? ???? ???????????? ??? ???? ????????????? ????? ????????? ?? ????????
i???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the mere evidence rule once did.227
Hayden was thus the penultimate case in the transition to a privacy-centered Fourth 
Amendment regime. The Court stated that it had ???????????????????? ????? ??????????????
object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and 
ha[d] increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property 
??????????228 ?????????????????????????????????????ad moved from a tort-based system to 
the exclusionary rule of Weeks ???????? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ????????? ????? ?????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????Silverthorne Lumber and Gouled229?both cases from the traditionalist era. 
While Hayden was straightforward that the Court had moved away from a property-based 
common law regime to a privacy-based structure, it did so with citation to a long series of 
cases that had walked through Founding-era intent in reaching the conclusion that privacy 
was at the core of the Fourth Amendment. 
C. Katz v. United States (1967) 
The best-known decision of the realist era came just months later. In Katz v. United 
States, the Court answered the question whether the warrantless recording of an 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
violated the Fourth Amendment.230 ?????????? ????????? ????????????????? ??????????? ?????
question on two grounds?first, for building an inquiry around whether a particular 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ???????????? ?????? ??? ???????????? ????? ?? ???????? ??????????????? ??????? ???
??????????231 ????????????????????????????????????????nsequentialist decisions,232 the Court 
overturned Olmstead to hold that the Fourth Amendment did prohibit such surveillance, 
?????????????????????????????????????????233
Katz is often treated as revolutionary not only because it overturned Olmstead, but 
also because, rather than conducting an historical inquiry, the Court looked to 
???????????????? ???? ??????????? ???? ?????????? ???? ???????? ????? ?????? ??????? ????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the m??????? ??? ???? ??????? ???????????234 Justice Harlan, writing in concurrence, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
226. Id. at 304?06 (discussing the ?shift in emphasis from property to privacy? that started as early as 
Silverthorne Lumber and Gouled). 
227. Id. at 305?10. 
228. Warden, 387 U.S. at 304. 
229. Id.
 230. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
231. Id. at 350. 
232. See David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 153?55
(2002) (arguing Katz and Terry v. Ohio took an ?ahistorical approach? to the Fourth Amendment). 
233. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
234. Id.
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ??????????????235 That standard effectively limited the 
revolutionary nature of Katz, because it meant that physical property and space would 
remain at the forefront of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence?it quickly became evident 
that the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????236
This tether to property law affirms the theory that Katz is better understood not as a 
revolution in Fourth Amendment law, but rather the culmination of a decades-long 
reaction to the formalist literalism of Olmstead. Certainly that is how the Katz Court saw 
its actions: it stated that its decisions since Olmstead and Goldman had effectively eroded 
??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????237 As shown 
above, those cases had discussed at length historical considerations and Founding-era 
principles.238 Moreover, those cases were themselves echoes of the dissents from 
Olmstead and Goldman, which relied in part on similar sources.239 On this theory, it is 
therefore Olmstead that is the outlier, not Katz?regardless of whether the latter explicitly 
relied on a historical foundation. If it is true that Katz was eliminating recent common law 
precedent that had fundamentally eroded rights the Founders would have intended to 
protect, it seems sufficient to rely implicitly on prior work. 
Thus, while Silverman ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????he modern age,240 Katz took them head on. In contrast to 
Boyd, which dealt with material (papers) that existed at the time of the Founding, or 
Carroll, which dealt with a mode of transport (the automobile) analogous to those of the 
Founding era, Katz finally grappled with revolutionary telecommunications technology 
with severe privacy implications. It certainly seems that the Katz Court saw itself as halting 
???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ??????????????Olmstead 
Cou??? ??? ????????? ????????? ???? ???????? ???? ????????-based interpretation of the Fourth 
?????????? ?? ???????? ??????241 the Katz Court instead stated an assumption that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? few specifically established and well-?????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
235. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting, crucially, that determining what protection the Fourth 
Amendment offers people ?generally . . . requires reference to a ?place??). 
 236. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for 
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809?12, 817?18 (2004) (arguing that Katz was less revolutionary than 
commonly thought, in keeping with the Court?s norm of deference to statute with regard to new technologies); 
see also Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 
(2011). Notably, the ?constitutionally protected area? term was not eliminated from the Court?s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence by Katz. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (conflating the phrase 
with a ?zone of privacy?).
237. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (citing Silverman and Hayden). Crucially, this suggests that the Katz Court saw 
Olmstead and Goldman?not Boyd?as creating the ?trespass? doctrine. 
238. See supra notes 210?213 and accompanying text on Silverman; supra notes 223?226 and accompanying 
text on Hayden.
239. See supra notes 183?190 and accompanying text on Olmstead; see supra notes 203?204 and 
accompanying text on Goldman.
 240. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961). 
241. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353?54. 
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search incident to arrest, hot pursuit, and consent.242 The Court depicted the government 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? and it saw 
no reason to do so.243
Further suggesting that Katz cannot be fairly criticized for its failure to explicitly 
rely on historical sources is the fact that the dissent ignored them too. Justice Black argued 
from the point of view of a textualist rather than what we would today call an originalist, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Court because the enumerated list of protected places describes only tangible things.244
The second half of his dissent focused on Olmstead and the subsequent cases that the Court 
had said eroded that holding, redefining them as holding that the Fourth Amendment did 
not cover eavesdropping, rather than holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply 
absent a trespass. But Justice Black did not go back to Boyd, let alone to Founding-era 
sources.245
* * * 
Though Katz became the touchstone of Fourth Amendment law, it is notable that the 
case itself pointed to other recent decisions as crucial in shoring up the erosion that resulted 
from the turn toward literalism in Carroll and Olmstead. It is particularly of note that 
Silverman appears as almost a prototype of the property-plus synthesis Justice Scalia 
would develop half a century later. Nonetheless, in light of the manner in which it 
incorporated the underlying assumptions of property law, the Katz reasonable expectation 
of privacy test proved flexible enough to persist for decades. 
VI. ORIGINALIST RESTORATION
Upon ascending to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia sought to apply his principles 
of textualism and originalism to the field of Fourth Amendment law. And, indeed, one of 
his most significant accomplishment was to re-??????? ???????????? ??????? ??????????
theory, if not its doctrine, to the Founding era.246 Over the span of two decades, in 
California v. Hodari D., Minnesota v. Carter, and Wyoming v. Houghton, Scalia 
rhetorically shifted the conversation to the eighteenth century, taking what he termed an 
original public meaning approach to find what was protected in the Founding era. But the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-???????????????????Kyllo v. United 
States, Jones v. United States, and Florida v. Jardines. That synthesis was designed as a 
bulwark against erosion of the right?and thus is not so different from Boyd, or even 
Silverman.
                                                          
242. Id. at 357?58. 
243. Id. at 358. 
244. Id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting). Though writing in dissent, Black admitted that Katz was not a revolution 
but rather the final point on a trend line: ?With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the 
Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began referring incessantly to the Fourth 
Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an individual?s
privacy.? Id. at 373. 
245. Id. at 367?72. 
246. See Timothy C. MacDonnell, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment: Text, Context, Clarity, and Occasional 
Faint-Hearted Originalism, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 175, 232?34 (2015). 
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A. California v. Hodari D. (1991) 
Justice Scalia began building the foundation for the property-plus test five years into 
his tenure, in 1991.247 In California v. Hodari D., the Court answered the question whether 
a show of authority (police calling for a fleeing suspect to halt) is a Fourth Amendment 
seizure when the suspect does not yield.248 Writing for the Court, Scalia applied a 
relatively early version of his trademark textualism. He cited dictionaries from 1828, 1856, 
and 1981; cases from 1825, 1862, 1870, and 1874; and treatises from 1930 and 1934 to 
?????????? ????? ???? ????? ?????????? ???? ??????? ???????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ????
????????????????????????????????????????249 ??????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
seizure.250 ?????? ?????? ??????????? ??????? ????? ????? ??? ???????? ????????????????? ???????
precedent on point.251
While self-c?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
neither rigorous nor particularly relevant to establishing what the text of the Fourth 
Amendment meant in the Founding era. The oldest dictionary he cited was published 
nearly four decades after the Fourth Amendment was ratified, so too his case citations. He 
offered no real justification for examining this hodgepodge of sources. Though writing a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n
meaning of the amendment and modern precedent do just as much work?if not more. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????Katz and Terry v. Ohio took an 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ????? ???????????252 Writing as a legal realist, Stevens 
?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? the 
???????? ????????-???????? ???????? ?????? ????????? ???????? ????? ???? ???????????? ????
??????????253 Scalia responded to these critiques in footnotes, arguing that Terry only 
applied to what standard of suspicion was required to justify a clear-cut physical seizure 
                                                          
 247. Two of Scalia?s earlier opinions suggested unease with Katz but did so only obliquely. In Arizona v. 
Hicks, Scalia wrote for the Court in holding that physically moving an object in an individual?s home exceeds 
the scope of the plain view doctrine. 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987). ?A search is a search,? Scalia wrote, 
acknowledging that ?the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy 
of us all.? Id. at 329. And in O’Connor v. Ortega, Scalia concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the 
plurality?s application of the Katz test. 480 U.S. 709, 731 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (?Where, 
for example, a fireman enters a private dwelling in response to an alarm, we do not ask whether the occupant has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy (and hence Fourth Amendment protection) vis-à-vis firemen, but rather 
whether-given the fact that the Fourth Amendment covers private dwellings-intrusion for the purpose of 
extinguishing a fire is reasonable.?). Curiously, writing for the Court in another 1987 opinion, Scalia rejected a 
?procrustean proposal? that defendants had attempted to root in the common law?explaining that the Court has 
?never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the 
often arcane rules of the common law.? Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). 
 248. 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (deciding the issue in order to determine whether drugs dropped by a suspect 
running from police were admissible evidence; the wrinkle being that the officer did not have probable cause to 
arrest the suspect until he dropped them). 
249. Id. at 624?25. 
250. Id. at 626. 
251. Id. at 627?29 (citing, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)). 
252. Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
253. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 646?48. 
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and Katz only applied to expand what items can be seized (but declining to attack either 
directly),254 and complaining that his usage of the common law was inten???????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????that is, Scalia (like the Court in Boyd) saw 
himself as constructing a bulwark against erosion of the right.255 But Scalia did not 
seriously challenge the notion that he should not be consulting common law sources to do 
so. Nor, given that he fully justified the holding with his discussion of Mendenhall, did he 
have to. If anything, the dissent gave the opinion more credit for taking a textualist 
approach than it deserved. 
B. Minnesota v. Carter (1998) 
Seven years later, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) took the opportunity to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????256 In Minnesota v. Carter, the 
Court answered the question whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
??? ???????? ????????? ?????????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ??????????
cocaine. The Court held that he did not.257 Scalia agreed, but saw fit to answer a different 
?????????? ????????? ?? ??????? ??? ???????? ???????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????????? has 
occurred??258 Consulting a range of sources from Entick through the Founding era, he 
?????????? ????? ???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????his own 
????????????????????????????????????259
????????????????????????????????????????????????Carter was more rigorous than it had 
been in Hodari D. (although Scalia still ignored Cuddihy?even though Carter came three 
???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
constitutions that contained language similar to the Fourth Amendment, noting that two of 
them intentionally avoided any ambiguity about whose houses were covered, and that two 
state ratification conventions sought an amendment with protection specific to an 
??????????????????????260 He affirmed this understanding with a line of common law cases 
from both sides of the Atlantic, foregoing Entick for a line of cases dating back to 1604 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????261
                                                          
254. Id. at 627 n.3. 
255. Id. at 626 n.2; see MacDonnell, supra note 2466, at 191 (?Once the logical application of a Court-made 
test outpaces the [constitutional] text it is meant to implement, the test must yield to the actual words of the 
Amendment.?). 
 256. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
257. Id. at 85. 
258. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 93?94 (eliding the fact that one could apply a different canon of construction to conclude that the 
broader language was intentional merely by stating that there was ?no indication anyone believed? that to be the 
case). 
261. Carter, 525 U.S. at 94?95 (citing Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520 (1816) for the premise that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect ?only the Lord of the Manor who holds his estate in fee simple,? but includes 
mortgagees, boarders, and so on?but not strangers or visitors taking refuge; query whether this really resolves 
the question whether a business guest is protected). 
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??????????????????????????????t and 4-century-?????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? Katz?? ?????? ??? ?????-??????????? ????? ????? ???????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????262 The di???????? ?????????????? ????? ????????? ????????? ????????????
??????????????????????????????????Katz ??????????????????????????????????????????????Katz,
which stare decisis ??????????????????????????????????????????263
C. Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) 
Justice Scalia????????? ???????????????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????????
came one year later. In Wyoming v. Houghton, the Court answered the question whether 
probable cause may justify the warrantless search of a car and containers within it, even if 
those container belong to a passenger.264 To answer that question in the affirmative,265
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the [Fourth] 
Amendmen?????? ????????266 This was a remarkable move that echoed the lip service 
Carroll had given to the same notion, but was an approach that in fact had long since been 
abandoned by the Court.267 For support, Scalia cited a 1995 opinion by Justice Thomas 
saying the ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????? in Hodari D.268
Two other things stand out about Houghton. First, in performing his historical 
analysis, Scalia did not cite a single historical source. Instead of eighteenth-century 
common law, he cited the work done already by the Court in Boyd, in Carroll and, at the 
most length, in a 1982 case, United States v. Ross, that itself relied on Carroll?essentially 
reasoning in the manner of a common law judge.269 ???????????????????????????????????
to begin with history was new, the nature of the work was not: it has much more in common 
with what the Court had done in case after case over two centuries (indeed, Ross itself was 
written by Justice Stevens). And second, despite the fact that Scalia stressed the need to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-balancing 
than to historical analysis.270 Just as he did in Hodari D., Scalia took a belt-and-suspenders 
approach to his analysis. Such an approach was necessary: Justice Breyer thought the 
                                                          
262. Id. at 97?98. 
263. Id. at 111 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 264. 526 U.S. 295, 297 (1999). 
265. Id. at 307 (declining to replicate Scalia?s Carter analysis of possible distinctions between whose property 
is protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
266. Id. at 299. 
267. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. The degree to which this is a departure should be clear from 
Justice Stevens? dissent in Hodari D..
268. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) and Hodari D., 499 
U.S. at 624 (ignoring the fact that, as discussed in Part VI.A, Hodari D. itself did not cite Founding-era sources). 
269. Id. at 300?01 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 (1982)). This matched the motivation of 
what Keith Whittington called the ?old originalism,? a theory developed in reaction to the Warren Court and 
those who would advocate for living constitutionalism.See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 36, at 603?
06. Perhaps all Scalia wanted at the time was a restoration of the Boyd model of judging. This approach is 
somewhat in keeping with the idea Scalia was a faint-hearted originalist who saw the limits of the theory. 
270. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300?02 (roughly 1,000 words including citations to history); id. at 303?06 (roughly 
1,045 words including citations to cases applying balancing analysis). 
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originalist turn sufficiently troubling that he joined the Court but wrote separately to state 
????? ??? ???? ??? ????? ?????? ???? ?????????????? ????? ???????? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? but not 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????271
D. Kyllo v. United States (2001) 
Two years later, Justice Scalia wrote again for the Court, this time making strides 
toward a Fourth Amendment originalism acceptable to his fellow justices?albeit making 
some shaky claims in the process. In Kyllo v. United States, the Court answered the 
question whether the use of a heat-sensing thermal imaging device to detect heat levels 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????one from a public street.272 Citing 
Boyd?????????????????????????Entick to establish that visual surveillance of a home is not 
??????????? ??????? ????????? ??? ?????? ??? ????????? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ????????
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance 
???????????????273 At least with regard to the home, he wrote?without citation to a single 
historical source?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be 
????????????274 Prohibiting use of technology to reveal information that would otherwise 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
against government that existed w???? ???? ??????? ?????????? ???? ?????????275 As in 
Hodari D., Scalia saw himself as constructing a bulwark against erosion of the right.276
Kyllo may be seen as a triumph for Scalia in two senses: first, he found a way to get 
the Court to accept incorporation of Founding-era common law into its Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, thus re-rooting the amendment in the eighteenth century; and second, he 
did so in a way that advanced his favored theory of that history?one focused on property 
rights in general and the law of trespass in particular. 
With regard to the first of these, Scalia was successful because he was able to create 
a synthesis approach that unified his preferred method with the rationale at the heart of 
Katz. In one way, this was a more sophisticated version of the belt-and-suspenders 
approach he took in Houghton. But unlike in Houghton, Scalia depicted the common law 
in the Founding era as a floor below which privacy may not erode, not a complete guide 
to modern protections (curiously, he did so once again without citation to a single historical 
source).277 He moderated his criticism of Katz?? ??????? ????? ???? ????? ????? ?????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????278 and embracing the fact 
                                                          
271. Id. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring). Academics at the time were similarly quite critical of Scalia?s
approach. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 
1813?14 (2000) (arguing that it is ?unjustified? by either the text of the Amendment or the discernible intentions 
of its Framers). 
 272. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
273. Id. at 33?34. 
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See supra note 2555 and accompanying text. 
 277. Sklansky, Back to the Future, supra note 2322, at 182?84 (taking a more favorable view of Scalia?s new 
tack); see also MacDonnell, supra note 247, at 243 (describing Kyllo as Scalia?s compromise with Souter, 
Ginsberg, and Breyer??three traditionally liberal justices?).
 278. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (citing a treatise, an article by Judge Posner, and his own concurrence in Carter). 
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??????????????????????????? a mechanical i???????????????????????????????????????????????????
encroachment of technology onto privacy rights.279 Indeed, Scalia advanced a Katz-like 
concern about ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????280 Katz relied on case law to support the assumption that searches 
outside the judicial process were per se unreasonable, while Scalia explicitly said that he 
relies on Founding-era common law. But neither case cited historical sources, and both 
cases sought to ensure that the baseline of Fourth Amendment protections was not eroded 
by modern technology or police practice. This is a strange approach for a strong originalist 
????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
pr???????????????????????????????Silverman and abandoned in Katz.281
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
20th century, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-??????????????282
As above, however, that version of events overstates reality?Boyd makes much of 
property rights, effectively as a floor, but it is really about the broader principle underlying 
the Fourth Amendment; Hester??? ????? ??????? ????????? ?????????? ?????? ????? ???? ???????
Amendment was related to common-law trespass, but not tied to it.283 Not only that, but 
by citing Goldman and Olmstead to support his claim, Scalia singled out a brief literalist 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ?????????????????????
opening, however, what Scalia actually did with his opinion is very similar to what Boyd
did: he created a floor (based in physical space and justified by property law) below which 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????Katz test could erode Fourth Amendment rights in situations where an 
individual has lost a reason to expect privacy they once had.
E. United States v. Jones (2012) 
Just over a decade later, in 2012, Justice Scalia had the chance to cement his 
property-????????????????????????? ?????????????? ??????????????????United States v. Jones,
the Court answered the question whether attaching a GPS tracker to a vehicle without a 
warrant was a Fourth Amendment search.284 Scalia briefly used Entick to argue that the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? in the Founding 
era, though he otherwise relied on case citations rather than historical sources to how the 
Court has handled the issue over time.285 Rather than making trespass the exclusive test, 
???????????????????????-century guarantee against unreasona?????????????????????????????
the Katz ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????286 Scalia suggested 
that the two-????????????????????????????????????????????????Katz reasonable-expectation-
                                                          
279. Id. at 35. 
280. Id. at 27, 34. 
281. Id. at 34. See also supra notes 216?221 and accompanying text. 
282. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31. 
283. See supra notes 116?119 and accompanying text on Boyd; supra note 211 and accompanying text on 
Hester.
 284. 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012). 
285. Id. at 405. 
286. Id. at 411 (writing in response to Justice Alito?s concurrence, which complained that the Court decided 
the case on ?18th-century tort law,? id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
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of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory 
??????287 Because a vehicle is an effect and installation of the tracker physically intruded 
onto it, it constituted a search.288
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
tied to common-???? ?????????? ??? ?????? ?????? ???? ??????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ?????????289 He 
doubled down by describing older cases like Olmstead ??????????????exclusively property-
?????? ??????????290 ????? ???? ??????? ?????????? ???????????? ??? ??????? ?? ???????????
concern for government trespass upon the areas . . . ??? ????????????291 On that 
??????????????? ??? ???? ??? ?????????????? ???? ????? ????? ???? ??????????? ???? ????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????292 Moreover, in 
Jones, he took the opportunity to resolve at least one way in which trespass law and Fourth 
Amendment protections are disconnected: an open field, he said, is not one of the areas 
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.293
This property-rights focus drew critiques. Justice Sotomay?????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ???????????? ????????????????????????294 Sotomayor described Katz ?????????????????
???? ????????????-prevailing focus ????????????????????295 ????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ????????? ???????? ??????????????? ????????Katz?s
protections.296 Specifically, she suggested that the scope of metadata that users voluntarily 
disclose to telecommunications service providers was so vast that warrantless disclosure 
of such material in the aggregate might violate the Fourth Amendment.297 Given that 
Justice Sotomayor was the sole liberal ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
focus was that diminishing societal expectations of privacy might erode a constitutional 
right, it was reasonable to conclude that she had an outsize role in how Scalia shaped his 
                                                          
287. Id. at 409. Cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(?Cases such as Silverman . . . hold that, when the government does engage in physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment even if the same information could have been obtained by other means. I do not believe that 
Katz, or its progeny, have eroded that principle.?). 
288. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. Three years prior Scalia had recognized the limits of originalism in noting that 
?the historical scope of officers? authority to search vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain.? Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629?31 (2004) 
(Scalia J., concurring in the judgment)). 
289. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (citing his opinion in Kyllo and Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 236). 
290. Id. (emphasis added). 
291. Id. at 406. 
292. Id. at 406 n.3. 
293. Id. at 410?11 (citing Hester, United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987), and Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 176?77 (1984)).
294. Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
295. Id. (emphasis added). 
296. Id. at 414?15. 
297. Id. at 418 (?I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the 
Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.?); see infra Part 
VII.C; see generally Brandon Teachout, Gotta Collect It All!: Surveillance Law Lessons of Pokémon Go, 69
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 83 (2016). 
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?????????-?????????? a conclusion she affirmed in a tribute to him.298
By contrast, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, 
concurred in the judgment with an opinion effectively written in dissent, complaining that 
???????????? ???????? ???? ?????? ??????????? ???? ???????? ??? ?????? ??????? ????? ?????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????299 ???????????????????????????????????
pressed to find support in post-Katz cases for its trespass-??????????????300 Alito simply 
applied Katz and found that long-term GPS monitoring impinges on reasonable 
expectations of privacy.301
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Carter concurrence that the Katz test is at its worst when it is used to determine whether a 
search occurred in the first place, but is more useful in determining whether that search is 
reasonable. One wonders, then, if he saw this case as a midway point to abolishing the 
Katz test. 
F. Florida v. Jardines (2013) 
The final step in the creation of Justice Sca???????????????-??????????????????????????
Amendment came in 2013. In Florida v. Jardines, the Court answered the question 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
warrant, violates the Fourth Amendment.302 Scalia again cited Entick to stress the unique 
role of the home in Founding-era common law and its antecedents, and he again cited 
Blackstone to show that the principle that the curtilage of a home is part of the home has 
????????? ???? ???????? ???????but he otherwise focused on modern case law.303 Scalia 
????????????????????????????????????????-????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ????? ?????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ??????304 Here, because the police physically 
intruded into a constitutionally protected area, a violation occurred.305
????????????????????????????? ???? ????? ????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
????? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ??????????
protections,306 and once again his focus generated conflicting views: here, a concurrence 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????307 Like 
???????? ???????????? ???????????? ??? Jones, her opinion seems designed to ensure that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????controlling prior to Katz is not whole-
                                                          
 298. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, A Tribute to Justice Scalia, 126 YALE LAW J. 1609, 1610?11 (2017) (?I lost 
count of the number of communications Justice Scalia and I exchanged with one another, tweaking words and 
phrases to keep his majority opinion open for my concurrence.?). 
299. Jones, 565 U.S. at 419 & n.2 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing in a footnote that, in fact, it 
would not have). 
300. Id. at 424. 
301. Id. at 430. 
 302. 569 U.S. 1, 3 (2013). 
303. Id. at 6?8.
304. Id. at 11. Seeking this type of pragmatic, one-size-fits-all approach was, of course, a paramount concern 
for Scalia. See MacDonnell, supra note 246, at 206?18. 
305. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11. 
306. Id. at 5. 
307. Id. at 13 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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heartedly accepted. Kagan noted that, were Jardines to be decided entirely on REP 
grounds, Kyllo would have resolved the matter. But a close look at Kyllo reveals that Scalia 
???????????????????????????????????????-????????????????????????????????????????????????
property rights controlled the Fourth Amendment until Katz came down. 
For Alito, the action at issue?a police dog on the porch?would have been 
acceptable in the Founding era. Alito cited a series of treatises to show the common law 
allowed dogs to wander onto private property without committing a trespass, and a 1318 
Scottish law prohibiting interference with a police tracking dog to show that dogs have 
been used by law enforcement for centuries.308 Scalia rejected that point: for him, when 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????309
Finally, in a short 2015 per curium decision, the Court affirmed the conclusion that 
Jones and Jardines had definitively reestablished that physical intrusion on a 
constitutionally protected area????????????????????????????????is a search.310
* * * 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s line of cases fell short of his 
stated goal of deriving neutral constitutional meaning from history, it was certainly 
???????????? ?????? ??? ????????? ???????around the time he described himself as a faint-
hearted originalist?he conducted an analysis of historical sources to inform the meaning 
????????????????Hodari D. By the time he was describing common law judging as contrary 
to democracy in the late 1990s, he staked out a more aggressive position in Carter and
Houghton, pushing the Court to begin with th??????????????????????????????????????
began his move toward the property-plus synthesis in the 2000s, each of his three key cases 
used that original meaning?defined through physical space?to build a bulwark against 
erosion of the Fourth Amendment privacy right. Even though the latter two cases came 
around the time that Scalia was repudiating his faint-heartedness and purportedly relying 
on the originalist method,311 ????????? ?????????-?????? ?????????? ?????? ?? ?????? ????? ?????
Boyd and Silverman?that is, it looks like the work of a common law judge. 
VII. NOW WHAT?
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????particularly because unique 
majorities contributed to each case that contributed to the creation of the property-plus 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????312 but three 
                                                          
308. Id. at 23 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
309. Id. at 11 (majority opinion). 
310. Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (remanding for the lower court to determine 
whether the search was reasonable). 
311. See SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 42, at 86?87 (citing Kyllo and Jones as examples of 
originalism encompassing ?technology unknown when the operative words took effect?). 
 312. While there were a handful of Fourth Amendment cases in the post-Scalia 2015 and 2016 terms, none of 
those cases directly implicated the enumerated places clause, and none of the opinions deciding them cited much 
history.
In Utah v. Strieff, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress 
evidence seized incident to arrest when an illegal stop is attenuated by discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant. 
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016). Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas noted the exclusionary rule was a twentieth-
century innovation but otherwise imported no historical material into his analysis of the Brown attenuation 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???? ???????? ??nsciousness?and, at least for Justice Gorsuch, a primary mode of 
analysis. 
A. Byrd v. United States (2018) 
In Byrd v. United States, the Court answered the question whether the driver of a 
rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle w????????????????????????
permission to drive the car but was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental 
agreement.313 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy applied the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test but looked to the right to exclude an??????????????????????????
as the determinative factor.314 Because the driver had lawful possession of the car?even 
if he breached a contract?he had the right to exclude others from it, and therefore a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it.315
The Court and Justice Thomas (whose concurrence was joined by Justice Gorsuch) 
both noted that Byrd also argued that he had a common-law property interest in the car as 
a bailee; however, because he raised this argument for the first time on appeal to the Court, 
all declined to reach the issue.316 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????317 He set out several threshold questions 
????? ?????? ????? ??? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ???????? ????? ????? ??? ????????? ????????? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . ???????????????????????????????
meaning of the Fourth Amendment? Second, what body of law determines whether that 
property interest is present?modern state law, the common law of 1791, or something 
??????318
                                                          
factors. Id. at 2061. 
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court held that punishing suspected drunk drivers for refusing to take a blood 
test violates the Fourth Amendment, while punishment for refusal to take a breath test is justified under the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016). Writing for the Court, Justice Alito began with 
an eighteenth-century manual for justices of the peace, referenced the work of several legal historians, and cited 
a series of nineteenth-century cases?but his decision turned on recent precedent and a balancing test. Id. at
2174?75, 2184. 
In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, the Court overturned the Ninth Circuit?s ?provocation rule? on the grounds 
that it violated the ?settled and exclusive framework? set forth in the Court?s precedent on excessive force. 137 
S. Ct. 1539, 1546?47 (2017). 
Finally, in Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court held that Bivens does not allow a suit for damages by post-9/11 detainees 
and that their guards enjoyed qualified immunity. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017). Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy contrasted the Court?s present attitude toward implied rights of action to the ?ancien regime? of the 
1970s but did not return to pre-Bivens history in so doing. Id. at 1855?58. Justice Thomas?s concurrence in part 
complained that the Court had once again failed to look to the common law of 1867, as required by the Civil 
Rights Act of that year, which authorized the money damages underlying Bivens. Id. at 1870?72 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 313. 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1523 (2018). 
314. Id. at 1526?27 (citing Jardines for the principle that Katz ?supplements, rather than displaces,? a property 
rule). The opinion also mentioned in passing the Founders? motivations for the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1526 
(quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969)). 
315. Id. at 1528. 
316. Id. at 1526?27; id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
317. Id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
318. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1531. The tension between Thomas?s concurrence and Justice Alito?s concurrence, 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???? ???????? ??nsciousness?and, at least for Justice Gorsuch, a primary mode of 
analysis. 
A. Byrd v. United States (2018) 
In Byrd v. United States, the Court answered the question whether the driver of a 
rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle w????????????????????????
permission to drive the car but was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental 
agreement.313 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy applied the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test but looked to the right to exclude an??????????????????????????
as the determinative factor.314 Because the driver had lawful possession of the car?even 
if he breached a contract?he had the right to exclude others from it, and therefore a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it.315
The Court and Justice Thomas (whose concurrence was joined by Justice Gorsuch) 
both noted that Byrd also argued that he had a common-law property interest in the car as 
a bailee; however, because he raised this argument for the first time on appeal to the Court, 
all declined to reach the issue.316 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????317 He set out several threshold questions 
????? ?????? ????? ??? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ???????? ????? ????? ??? ????????? ????????? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . ???????????????????????????????
meaning of the Fourth Amendment? Second, what body of law determines whether that 
property interest is present?modern state law, the common law of 1791, or something 
??????318
                                                          
factors. Id. at 2061. 
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court held that punishing suspected drunk drivers for refusing to take a blood 
test violates the Fourth Amendment, while punishment for refusal to take a breath test is justified under the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016). Writing for the Court, Justice Alito began with 
an eighteenth-century manual for justices of the peace, referenced the work of several legal historians, and cited 
a series of nineteenth-century cases?but his decision turned on recent precedent and a balancing test. Id. at
2174?75, 2184. 
In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, the Court overturned the Ninth Circuit?s ?provocation rule? on the grounds 
that it violated the ?settled and exclusive framework? set forth in the Court?s precedent on excessive force. 137 
S. Ct. 1539, 1546?47 (2017). 
Finally, in Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court held that Bivens does not allow a suit for damages by post-9/11 detainees 
and that their guards enjoyed qualified immunity. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017). Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy contrasted the Court?s present attitude toward implied rights of action to the ?ancien regime? of the 
1970s but did not return to pre-Bivens history in so doing. Id. at 1855?58. Justice Thomas?s concurrence in part 
complained that the Court had once again failed to look to the common law of 1867, as required by the Civil 
Rights Act of that year, which authorized the money damages underlying Bivens. Id. at 1870?72 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 313. 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1523 (2018). 
314. Id. at 1526?27 (citing Jardines for the principle that Katz ?supplements, rather than displaces,? a property 
rule). The opinion also mentioned in passing the Founders? motivations for the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1526 
(quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969)). 
315. Id. at 1528. 
316. Id. at 1526?27; id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
317. Id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
318. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1531. The tension between Thomas?s concurrence and Justice Alito?s concurrence, 
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B. Collins v. Virginia (2018) 
In Collins v. Virginia, the Court answered the question whether the automobile 
exception permits a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter private 
property, approach a house, and search a vehicle (a motorcycle) parked a few feet from 
the house?that is, on its curtilage.319 Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor examined 
?????????????????????????????????????????xception and on curtilage, concluding that the 
former does not trump the latter.320 Although the opinion ultimately turned on the 
property-based concept of curtilage, it did not explicitly focus on property. Rather, it took 
the classic common-law approach of ?????????? ????? ??????????? ???? ?????????? ?????
historical reference????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????was made obliquely, quoting a 1982 decision 




preserves the baseline protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
was reasonable under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even though it took place on 
????????????????????????323 For Alito, the sole value of the curtilage inquiry is to determine 
whether the Fourth Amendment applies at all; after concluding that it does, the Court 
should apply the automobile exception (and thus conclude that the search at issue was 
reasonable).324 ???????? ????????? ????? ???? ????????? ???? ???? ????????? ????????-era 
principles?let alone sources. 
C. Carpenter v. United States (2018) 
In deciding its first major Fourth Am?????????????????????????????????????????????????
Court?or at least several of its members?grappled at last with historical sources. In 
Carpenter v. United States, the Court answered the question whether the warrantless 
seizure and search of comprehensive cell phone location records is permitted by the Fourth 
Amendment.325 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts applied Katz and the common 
???? ??? ????????? ????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????????? ??????? ??? ????? ????-site 
                                                          
which suggested that the driver?s reasonable expectation of privacy may not have been violated, id. at 1531?32 
(Alito, J., concurring), echoed an exchange between Gorsuch and Justice Alito at oral argument, when Gorsuch 
advanced a property-focused theory and Alito noted that the word ?property? does not appear in the Fourth 
Amendment. Damon Root, Neil Gorsuch and Samuel Alito Butt Heads Over the Fourth Amendment, Again,
REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Feb. 1, 2018, 10:05 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2018/02/01/neil-gorsuch-and-
samuel-alito-butt-heads. 
 319. 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1668 (2018). 
320. Id. at 1671?73. 
321. Id. at 1675 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982)). 
322. Id. at 1674. 
323. Id. at 1680?83 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
324. Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1681?82. 
 325. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). Under the third-party doctrine, information voluntarily conveyed to a third 
party does not enjoy Fourth Amendment protection. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); United States 
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442?43 (1976). 
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location information], its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable 




the Framers . . ???????????????????????????????????????????327 The majority opinion drew 
four dissents taking three separate tacks. 
Justice Kennedy, like Roberts, applied Katz and the common law, but he came to the 
opposite conclusion: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data because the 
cell-site location records are created and controlle?????????????????????????????????????????
????? ???????????? ??? ???????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????????????? ????
other purposes.328 Kennedy thus made the case for exactly the type of Fourth Amendment 
erosion Justice Sotomayor warned about in her Jones concurrence.329
Justice Thomas wrote to advance a stridently originalist position against Katz, the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????330 He 
recognized that the case was the culmination of a decade-???????????????????Olmstead?????
???????? ????? ??? ????? ????????? ???? ???????????? ??????????????? ????? ??? ???? ????????? ??????
property, with a new one?privacy.331 To show that the Founders did not focus on privacy, 
??????? ?????? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ????? ????????? ??? Founding-era legal dictionaries to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????with citations indicating that the 
full extent of his research was a series of perfunctory electronic database keyword 
searches????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-Katz federal 
or state case reporters, the papers of prominent Founders, early congressional documents 
and debates, collections of early American English texts, or early American 
????????????332 More seriously, Thomas quickly quoted the usual suspects?the 
Commentaries, Coke, Locke, Entick, and Wilkes?to show that the Founders did focus on 
property.333 Thomas took the position that the property line is not only a bulwark against 
                                                          
326. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
327. Id.
328. Id. at 2229?30, 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
329. See supra notes 294?298 & accompanying text. Kennedy seemed to recognize that fact and attempted to 
refute it, protesting that cell-site location information ?could not reveal where Carpenter lives and works, much 
less his ?familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,?? because the information ?disclose[s] 
a person?s location only in a general area.? 138 S. Ct. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)). Even allowing arguendo that this is an accurate description of the limits of the 
technology, one can imagine a world without those limits?but the same legal logic as to expectations of privacy 
would apply. 
 330. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He also took a moment to observe that ?the 
Founders would not recognize the Court?s ?warrant requirement.?? Id. at 2244. 
331. Id. at 2236, 2240. 
332. Id. at 2238 & nn.2?5 (citing ?NATIONAL ARCHIVES, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov (all Internet materials as last visited June 18, 2018)?; ?A CENTURY OF LAWMAKING 
FOR A NEW NATION, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES, 1774?1875 (May 1, 2003), 
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.html?; ?CORPUS OF HISTORICAL AMERICAN ENGLISH,
https://corpus.byu.edu/coha; GOOGLE BOOKS (American), https://googlebooks.byu.edu/x.asp; CORPUS OF 
FOUNDING ERA AMERICAN ENGLISH, https://lawncl.byu.edu/cofea?; ?READEX, AMERICA?S HISTORICAL 
NEWSPAPERS (2018), https://www.readex.com/content/americas-historical-newspapers?). 
333. Id. at 2239?40. 
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erosion of Founding-era rights, but a high-water mark as well.334 Thus, because Carpenter 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????-site records, the Fourth Amendment did 
not protect him against their search.335
Justice Alito, joined by Thomas, also took a strident originalist position, but one 
focused on attacking the idea that a subpoena may be a search (while agreeing that the 
cell-????????????????????????????????????????336 Alito cited Blackstone for the proposition 
that the subpoena dates to the fourteenth century and relied on sixteenth and seventeenth 
century treatises to trace its development through to the Founding era.337 In discussing 
that period, he cited the Judiciary Act of 1789 (which allowed subpoenas) and two more-
or-less contemporaneous English cases (but notably no American counterparts) to show 
that the use of subpoenas were routine and wide-ranging.338 ??????????????????????????????
extensive concern about the violence of physical searches as support for his conclusion 
????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ????? ?????????? ?????????? ????????? against the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????? ??? ???? ???? ???????????339 Like Thomas, then, Alito saw Founding-era 
property law as creating both a floor and a ceiling for Fourth Amendment rights. 
Finally, like Scalia before him, Justice Gorsuch applied a mixture of common law 
and originalist analysis to conclude that???? ????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ???????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the 
Court will have to consider whether an individual has a property interest in data collected 
about him.340 First, he critiqued the third-???????????????????????????????????????????????????
a third party access to private papers that remain my property is not the same thing as 
??????????? ??????????????? ???????????????? ????????????????341 Next, he critiqued Katz,
citing the standards?Entick, Wilkes, and the Writs of Assistance case?for the proposition 
????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ?????????342 The Katz test, he said, 
provides insufficient guidance to ensure courts stay within these limitations?and, in data 
privacy cases, may go the other direction.343 Gorsuc????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????344 He then advanced the 
most obvious doctrinal claim for a Fourth Amendment right in papers or effects held by a 
?????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????? ??? ????????????? ??operty but are held by another as a 
                                                          
334. Id. at 2245?46. Notably, Thomas also looks to the development of the enumerated places clause, 
speculating that the changes ?might have narrowed the Fourth Amendment,? or ?might have broadened? it. ?Or
it might have done both.? Id. at 2241. But he declined to draw from this indeterminacy an explicit recognition of 
the limitations of a purely historical approach. 
335. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2242?43 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
336. Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
337. Id. at 2247?48. 
338. Id. at 2248?50. 
339. Id. at 2251?52. With all of that said, Alito acknowledges that the Court does now evaluate subpoenas 
under the Fourth Amendment?albeit under a lower standard than a physical search?but argues that the majority 
fails to follow that standard. Id. at 2252?57. 
340. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267?72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
341. Id. at 2263. 
342. Id. at 2264. 
343. Id. at 2265?67. 
344. Id. at 2267?68 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013)). 
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bailment.345 While citing cases from the early twentieth century rather than the Founding 
era, Gorsuch readily acknowledged that he was raising more questions than answers?and 
practically begged for future petitioners to bring forth the latter so that the Court can ensure 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????346
While the five opinions in Carpenter v. United States represent three distinct 
alternatives for the rhetorical direction the Court may take, the likely path forward is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Boyd:
there is a baseline of Fourth Amendment protection that shall not be eroded. While 
Gorsuch dissented, his opinion squarely followed Sc?????????????????and exhorts litigants 
to do the same. From Jones, we know that Sotomayor?who joined the Carpenter majority 
but did not write?shares an appreciation for that approach. And Thomas and Alito, who 
clearly reach very different conclusions, remain serious about taking a historical approach. 
Thus, taken as a whole, the opinions in Carpenter ???????? ????? ????????? ????????-plus 
synthesis will endure. 
* * * 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????347 ???????????????????????????
originalist???348 ??? ??? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????????? ?????? ????????????? ????? ??? ?????????
originalism-in-practice was not as novel as he claimed, his use of history not always that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
three key Fourth Amendment cases of the post-Scalia era strongly suggest that his effort 
to return the Court to its traditional use of Founding-era sources and their common law 
antecedents?that is, his incremental originalism?will prove a legacy worthy of the 
????????????????
                                                          
345. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268?69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878)). 
346. Id. at 2268?72 (?Neglecting more traditional approaches may mean failing to vindicate the full protections 
of the Fourth Amendment. . . . These omissions do not serve the development of a sound or fully protective 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.?). 
 347. See Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917 & nn. 
1?2 (2005) (citing usage). 
348. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010). 
